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We introduce a new approach to measuring the possible impact of fu-
tures speculation on spot commodity prices. We advocate the use of a
non-parametric, highly flexible empirical model for measuring this im-
pact, in order to account for possible non-linearity in the transmission
from futures to spot market. Empirical results for the coffee market show
that most of the changes in spot prices can be attributed to shifts in de-
mand and - in particular - supply. Nevertheless, speculation is an impor-
tant part of the coffee price generation process. The effect of speculation
on the price of coffee is indeed spiky, which explains why traditional,
mean-variance based methods have failed to identify this. However, it
is also significant, both statistically and economically. An extensive ro-
bustness analysis confirms the validity of our results, and - within the
limitations posed by the data - we have been able to establish causality.
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I. Introduction
Much of the economic literature dwells on the notion that as a market clears,
demand equals supply, and an asset, physical good or derivative is traded
at the market clearing price. But how much does that price indeed reflect
the underlying fundamentals, demand, supply and their constituents, such
as productivity, purchasing power, the price of raw materials and energy?
And how much does it matter whether the market clearing price reflects those
fundamentals?
In the last decade, the latter question has gained in importance as rising
food prices have led to riots in India, Mexico and Yemen, a boycott of toma-
toes in Argentina during the presidential elections, a one-day boycott of pasta
organized by Italian shops and a price freeze on certain basic foods by the Rus-
sian government (Kingsbury, 2007). The consequences of rising food prices are
particularly worrying for third world countries, where people spend between
60 and 80 percent of their income on food, compared with 10 to 20 percent for
people in industrialized countries (Wahl, 2008). The World Bank forecasts that
between 73 and 105 million people will fall below the absolute poverty line in
the near future due to food crises as the result of rising prices (World Bank,
2008).
But what has produced these high prices? Is it, for example, a downward
shift in supply as a result of soil exhaustion and climate change? Is it an up-
ward shift in demand as a result of increasing wealth in developing countries?
Has the price elasticity of supply changed as a result of changes in production
techniques? Have consumers become less price elastic?
This paper presents an analysis of the development of the price of coffee.
Although coffee is not the largest commodity in the commodity futures in-
dex, it is traded globally, and its production, consumption and inventories are
well documented. The paper’s contribution consists of asking a very impor-
tant additional question: has commodity futures speculation contributed to
rising prices? We present a simple model, where the price of a commodity
is the result of demand and supply as well as factors that can shift demand
and supply. In an extension of the model, producers can try to earn a profit,
via arbitrage between spot and futures markets. There is an arbitrage oppor-
tunity if there is 'enough' production: with too much production, arbitrage
gains from selling in the future are not feasible for many producers, whereas
with too little production, producers cannot credibly commit to trading on the
futures market, as they risk violating their short-run budget constraint. We
demonstrate how our model is in fact similar to a production model where
the price is the output, and inputs include demand and supply, specified in
such a way that increases in each input can be expected to increase the price.
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This model can be operationalized using a non-parametric production model,
incorporating inefficiency in production. Known advantages of this modeling
approach include the fact that it does not require normally distributed vari-
ables, nor does it require us to specify a production function, but it does allow
us to measure deviations from the 'optimal' output (here, the price) without
the ex-ante imposition of a distribution on these deviations. As a result, we
can measure the possible effect of speculation in a flexible, relatively agnostic
manner. And since our model is an efficiency model, this effect is measured
as a decrease in inefficiency.
We apply the model using a single commodity, coffee, chosen for the reasons
given above. Using a detailed data set on coffee production, consumption and
related factors, we investigate whether speculative futures market positions
have an effect on the coffee price. Subsequently, we execute an elaborate set of
robustness tests to establish causality, minimize measurement problems, test
the sensitivity to model assumptions and measure policy implications.
Our results show that futures speculation is indeed part of the coffee price
generation process. The effect of speculation on the coffee price is spiky, but
statistically and economically significant. We find some evidence of substi-
tution effects with oil, the most important commodity in commodity index
futures, and evidence of market impact as a result of sharp increases in index
futures investment by institutional investors in the last decade.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section II, we present a short overview of
the key developments in the literature on this topic, and summarize the most
important developments in the coffee market. Section III describes our theo-
retical model, empirical setup and the formal derivations of our hypothesis.
In Section IV, we introduce our data. Section V gives our results, and Section
VI our conclusions.
II. Context
In this section, we describe the context in which our analysis takes place. We
first present a brief review of the literature on the relationship between futures
and spot commodity prices. Subsequently, we discuss developments in the
coffee market.
A. The possible (or impossible) effect of futures on spot prices
For most commodities, the rise in prices has coincided with the increasing
popularity of commodity index futures, as institutional investors increased
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their exposure to commodities following the deregulation in important com-
modity derivatives markets which began in 2000. As yet unresolved is the
issue of whether there is also a causal relationship between the two events,
and if so, in which direction.
The latter issue gained momentum in 2008, when hedge fund manager
Michael Masters claimed in testimony before the US Senate that commodity
index futures investments are partly to blame for the commodity price in-
creases. Masters later urged the Senate to vote in favor of the new Wall Street
Transparency and Accountability Act (Masters, 2008). Meanwhile, Irwin and
Sanders (2010) published the preliminary results of a study commissioned by
the OECD’s Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Department on "The Impact of In-
dex and Swap Funds on Commodity Futures Markets," concluding that there
was no such relationship.1
The literature on the possible (or impossible) relationship between spot and
futures prices of commodities has a long history. Stein (1961) developed a
model where spot and futures prices are determined simultaneously, as a re-
sult of changes in (excess) supply or changes in price expectations. Garbade
and Silber (1983) showed that storage and transaction costs constrain the sup-
ply of arbitrage services, as a result of which futures contracts provide imper-
fect risk transfer in the short run. They find that futures markets tend to lead
cash markets.
Turnovsky (1983), relying on the fact that the futures price is a weighted
average of the current and expected future spot price, showed that the impact
of the futures market on the long-run spot price and its variance depends on
the underlying parameters of supply and inventory demand. Related to this,
Fama and French (1987) studied two different models of commodity futures
prices. With their first model, they focused on the importance of convenience
yields (cost of carry) for explaining the basis (the difference between future
and spot prices). With their second model, the futures price was modeled as a
function of the forecast of the spot price plus an expected premium.
Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) further contributed by enhancing the ra-
tional expectations competitive storage model. They showed that since a com-
modities market as a whole cannot carry negative inventories, the commodity
prices predicted by the model are characterized by a high degree of autocor-
relation, with occasional extreme spikes (Deaton and Laroque, 1992). Subse-
quently, they explored the non-linearities in the model further and introduced
risk-neutral commodity speculators, whose introduction increased the auto-
correlation in spot prices (Deaton and Laroque, 1996).
1Other studies with overviews of the literature include Acharya et al. (2011), CFTC (2006),
Wahl (2008), Irwin and Sanders (2011), Irwin et al. (2009), Tang and Xiong (2010) and
Meijerink et al. (2011).
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Currently, the idea that increased futures price volatility can result in spot
price volatility is largely unquestioned (Irwin and Sanders, 2011; Irwin et al.,
2009). Not generally accepted however is the possibility that futures prices
may also affect the level of spot prices, despite early evidence pointing in this
direction. Chan (1992) showed that there is an asymmetric lead-lag relation-
ship between futures and stocks. When there is co-movement among stocks,
a futures index tends to lead the cash index, since the former is able to react
faster to new information than the latter. Subrahmanyam (1991) demonstrated
theoretically that while the introduction of an index does not have an effect
on price volatility, it does strengthen the relationship between the price of the
index and the prices of the underlying assets in both directions. Booth et al.
(1999) showed empirically that index futures dominate stock indexes and in-
dex options, using German DAX data. The low transaction costs of index
futures explain their high information share.
Pindyck (1993) formalized the relationship between futures and spot com-
modity prices, emphasizing the role of changes in the expected future con-
venience yield. Given that, in Pindyck’s model, the spot price is the present
value of future convenience yields, the channel introduced here can be seen as
a second order effect, where changes in current and future demand, besides
having a direct effect on the price, change expected future convenience yields
(and futures prices), thereby further affecting spot prices. Hochman et al.
(2011) presented evidence in line with Pindyck (1993), finding that inventory
adjustments contribute significantly to commodity spot price increases, after
controlling for other factors such as economic growth, bio-fuel expansion, ex-
change rate fluctuations, and energy price inflation.
Proving that causality runs in one or possibly both directions can be very
difficult. Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Irwin et al. (2009) based their analysis
on the most commonly used methods: vector auto regression (VAR) models
and Granger causality tests. They found no evidence that higher futures prices
have led to higher spot prices. Advantages of these methods are that they
make full use of the time series available for spot and futures prices, and
allow for statistical inference. But there are also disadvantages. First, lack of
evidence of Granger causality may be the result of the non-linearities Deaton
and Laroque (1996) explored. Second, any hypothesis test based on these
methods concerns the average impact of one price on the other, and is relatively
insensitive to short periods in which this impact may be more intense, as
suggested by Garbade and Silber (1983) and Chan (1992), among others. Third,
an implicit assumption in these tests is that the possible impact of speculation
is independent of other factors that may affect the price, such as inventories.
A different approach was taken by Korniotis (2009), who tried to exploit
a quasi-natural experiment that occurred because futures contracts exist for
FUTURES SPECULATION AND COMMODITY PRICES 6
some industrial metals and not for others. He found that co-movement of spot
prices between both groups has stayed constant despite a surge in futures
speculation.2 Bryant et al. (2006) took a slightly different approach and ap-
plied a Causal Inference (CI) algorithm. He found that Keynes’ normal back-
wardation theory, which says that futures speculators can earn a premium as
hedgers pass on risk through futures market, was rejected. Interestingly, any
effect of speculation on spot price volatility was also rejected.
Recent studies have focused on three additional elements that may explain a
causal link between futures and spot market. The first element is presented by
Tang and Xiong (2010), Singleton (2011), Henderson et al. (2012) and others,
who examined the changes in the micro-structure of futures markets. Single-
ton (2011) focused on crude oil, and found evidence of an "economically and
statistically significant effect of investment flows on futures prices."3 He found
that the index positions and "managed-money spread positions" affected crude
oil futures prices the most. Tang and Xiong (2010) found that the rise of com-
modity futures index investment has contributed to the increase in the corre-
lation between commodity spot prices in the US, reflecting the financialization
of these markets. He contrasted this with developments in China, where com-
modity markets are driven much more by fundamentals and this increase in
correlation has not occurred. Finally, Henderson et al. (2012), using a new
data set of Commodity-Linked Notes, found that hedging trades executed by
the issuers of these notes have resulted in a significant price impact on futures
prices.
The second element was presented by Acharya et al. (2011), who applied
the limits-to-arbitrage theory to commodity markets. In their model, capital-
constrained speculators face hedging commodity producers in commodity fu-
tures markets. Hedging costs depend positively on the demand for hedging
by producers and negatively on the risk capacity of speculators. As institu-
tional investors’ (speculative) demand for commodity index futures increases,
the commodity futures risk premium is no longer simply determined by the
convenience yield. They therefore concluded that "limits to financial arbi-
trage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect both asset and goods
prices." The same limits-to-arbitrage argument has also been used by Hong
and Yogo (2012), who showed that as a result, futures prices have become less
2Korniotis (2009) also tried to examine the relationship between speculation and spot prices
using a storage model applied to industrial metals. He finds no evidence of hoarding, as
inventories tend to drop as spot prices increased. Also, the S&P Goldman-Sachs Commod-
ity Index returns are not correlated with metal prices.
3Singleton controls for US and other stock market returns, "balance-sheet flexibility of large
financial institutions, open interest, the future/spot basis, and lagged returns on oil fu-
tures."
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informative about the real economy, including spot prices.4
The third element was presented by Frankel (2008), who focused on the
impact of real interest rates on real prices of mineral and agricultural com-
modities. In light of the low real interest rates of the last years, his argument
goes as follows: low interest rates lead to increased demand for storable com-
modities, and may also increase the supply of these commodities. At the same
time, the cost of inventory drops and treasury bills become a less attractive
investment. The result is an increase in spot commodity prices.
In summary, there are enough arguments theoretically speaking as to why
the futures price may go up as a result of a speculative influx, as well as to
why this may have an effect on the spot price. In Section III, we discuss the
question of how we can ascertain whether the latter is indeed the case. For
now, we conclude that supply and demand in the spot market, factors that can
shift that supply and demand, and the market microstructure of the futures
market can all have an effect on the spot price. Each of these elements will
therefore appear in our theoretical and empirical analysis.
B. Developments in the coffee market
In 2009/2010, the last year of our sample, coffee accounted for USD15.4 bil-
lion in exports, making it the most traded tropical agricultural commodity
(International Coffee Organization, 2012). In 2010, coffee was produced in
approximately 70 countries, exceeding 10 percent of total export earnings in
seven of those countries (International Coffee Organization, 2012). At the same
time, consumption was 133.9 million bags, having increased by approximately
1.2 percent since the early 1980s (International Coffee Organization, 2012).5
Futures contracts for Arabica coffee, which is the prime bean in most coffee
blends, are traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
The coffee market has for a long time been regulated by the International
Coffee Agreement (ICA). Due to overproduction in the period from 1954 to
1956, Latin American producers decided to start controlling their production
to stabilize the price. In 1958, all Latin American countries signed the Latin
American Agreement (LAA), with the objective of stabilizing prices. How-
ever, because a large portion of coffee production was in Africa, the LAA did
not work. In 1962, a large number of producing countries both from Africa
and Latin America, as well as consuming countries, signed the first ICA. They
agreed on a price target and export quotas for each producing country (Davi-
ron and Ponte, 2005).
4Hong and Yogo (2012) showed that open interest, which is not (or less) hampered by limits
to arbitrage is a much more accurate signal.
5One bag = 60kg.
FUTURES SPECULATION AND COMMODITY PRICES 8
According to Daviron (1996), four factors contributed to the success of the
regime. First, the participation of consuming countries in the ICA was impor-
tant. The consuming countries did not undermine the agreement by buying
coffee from non-members. Second, in the producing countries, governments
had control over exports. Because the volumes that these governments con-
trolled were relatively large compared with the market, governments could
effectively regulate the market. Third, Brazil’s acceptance of production cuts
was essential to create upward pressure on the price, as Brazil is the largest
producer of coffee. And fourth, the members agreed to import part of each
other’s production when production was too high, thus sharing the burden of
overproduction.
However, the ICA was eventually undermined by free-riding and dissention
about quotas. Furthermore, more and more non-member countries started or
increased production, and subsequently traded at lower prices. When the
consumption of coffee in the United States rose, importers started to buy from
non-member countries. Due to Cold War politics, relations between Latin
America and the United States changed. The United States no longer saw the
political left in Brazil as a threat and the quota system prevented the United
States from punishing other Latin American countries (Bates, 1997).
When the ICA collapsed in 1989, market power shifted from the producing
countries’ coffee agencies to private trading companies. This was partly due
to the shift in control over inventory stocks. While the ICA was functioning,
inventory had mostly been held in producing countries. As a consequence of
its breakdown however, inventory was moved to consuming countries. In the
period after the breakdown of the ICA, prices dropped enormously. Up to
1989, the ICA had provided the producers of coffee with stable and minimum
prices. After 1989, the futures (and options) markets of New York, for Arabica,
and London, for Robusta, took off (Rutten and Youssef, 2007).
When we compare the indicator price of the International Coffee Organiza-
tion (ICO) five years before the breakdown and five years after, we observe
that prices dropped from $1.34 per pound (1984-1988) to $0.77 (1990-1994).
This led to the bankruptcy of many public coffee agencies in producing coun-
tries. In 1993, the coffee producing countries established the Association of
Coffee Producer Countries (ACPC) to try to regain control over the supply of
coffee and export flows. Akiyama and Varangis (1990) provided an assessment
of the impact of the ICA on producing countries, and found that the ICA con-
tributed to a reduction of risk, but mainly benefited large producers in terms
of returns. Local effects, however, differ significantly since there was evidence
of oligopsony power in some producing countries (Lopez and You, 1993).
Since the breakdown of the ICA, a liberalization process has taken place in
producing countries and not all major producing countries have been willing
FUTURES SPECULATION AND COMMODITY PRICES 9
to join the ACPC. The withdrawal of member countries from the ACPC in
1998/1999 plus the fact that Brazil exceeded its quota by six million bags of
coffee resulted in the emergence of a new plan that came into operation in
October 2000. This plan was intended to solve the problem of overproduction,
which had already been a market feature for a couple of years. It was agreed
by the member countries that if the ICO price indicator was below $95 cents
on a 15 day average basis, supply would be reduced by 20 per cent. As well
as the member countries, non-member countries promised to cooperate with
the plan. But the main weakness of the plan was that it did not include any
provision for destroying stocks, so the problem of overproduction was not re-
solved. And the price indicator provided by the ICO fluctuated between $0.69
in May 2000 and $0.43-0.54 in the 2002 and 2003 years. In 2004, there was
some recovery, with a price of $0.62 (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). Meanwhile,
with the rise of fair trade and eco labels, coffee growers have tried to ben-
efit from consumers’ willingness-to-pay for speciality coffees (Loureiro and
Lotade, 2005). In terms of its magnitude, however, fair trade production is still
relatively small.
With overall demand for coffee on the rise, interest has turned to produc-
tion. Coffee supply is characterized by long lags (Wickens and Greenfield,
1973; Parikh, 1979), with cooperatives generally being less scale-efficient than
investor-owned producers (Mosheim, 2002). With coffee production contribut-
ing significantly to local economies, Ninan and Sathyapalan (2005) found, for
India, that biodiversity conservation has very high opportunity costs. Hein
and Gatzweiler (2006), however, found that Arabica coffee production itself
also benefits from the genetic diversity and resources contained in highland
forests (in Ethiopia), providing a strong argument for the need to halt defor-
estation.
Wollni and Zeller (2007) found, for Costa Rica, that producers that have
decided to supply the specialty coffee niche have been able to increase their
prices; these producers are usually in cooperatives. In many cases, however,
producers are not able to benefit fully from increases in world coffee prices, as
described by Fafchamps and Hill (2005) and Fafchamps and Hill (2008). Based
on data gathered in Uganda, Fafchamps and Hill showed how asymmetric
information problems plague small producers, who as a result lose out to the
rest of the supply chain: when international prices rose, growers received only
a small fraction of the price increase.
In summary, for most of the past twenty years, coffee production has been
characterized by a fairly large amount of competition. As coffee consumption
rose, so did coffee production, albeit gradually. As yet largely unclear is the
composition of international coffee prices. As a result, relatively little is known
about the consequences for coffee growers of changes in these international
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prices.
III. Theory
In this section, we model the price of coffee, using an approach that is akin to
models of price discovery (Gansler, 2009), where the coffee price is the output
of a process and demand, supply, demand and supply shifters and futures
market equivalents all function as potential inputs.
This way of modeling has two advantages. First, it allows us to reformulate
the debate regarding the possible impact of future market speculation on spot
prices clearly as a question regarding omitted variables. What our modeling
process amounts to is asking whether future market speculation is indeed an
omitted variable in the coffee price generation process. The second advan-
tage is that, in demonstrating that this process can be viewed in much the
same way as a traditional production process, we can use an existing, non-
parametric production approach to investigate the possible impact of futures
market speculation without imposing much structure on the transformation
function and while allowing for possible 'peak' effects.
In the rest of this section, we first introduce a basic model for the short-run
price determination of coffee. Subsequently, we extend the model by intro-
ducing a futures market. After demonstrating how excluding relevant inputs
into the coffee price generation process leads to increasing underestimation of
the price, we then proceed with the development of an empirical framework
to see whether and to what extent speculation has been part of this process.
After proving that the results from our empirical analysis can indeed be used
to test our model’s key predictions, we introduce and discuss three hypothesis
tests that will establish the role futures market speculation plays in pushing
up coffee prices.
A. Basic model
To model the coffee price generation process, we build on the model of short-
run price determination for produce commodities of Sexton and Zhang (1996).
Sexton and Zhang (1996) are interested in the relative bargaining power of pro-
ducers and retailers, in the context of highly perishable produce commodities.6
In our analysis, we do not - to all intents and purposes - distinguish between
producers and retailers. Instead, we allow for storage of a commodity and the
6The empirical analysis in Sexton and Zhang (1996) focuses on the California iceberg lettuce
market.
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possibility, but by no means the certainty, that futures market developments
affect short-run supply in the spot market. Except where noted otherwise, we
closely follow Sexton and Zhang (1996), except in notation.7 The model de-
veloped here is typical for commodities, in that supply shocks are important
drivers of the price, and demand is assumed to be relatively inelastic.
At any given time t, the total production of coffee is Qt. The total production
is assumed to be the result of past, long-run investment decisions, and as a
result is independent of the current market price. At time t, supply is St.
The market value of a bag of coffee, Pt, is the result of supply and demand
Pt = R (St,Dt) (1)
where St is total coffee produced at t and shipped to the market at t, and
Dt is a vector of factors that can shift demand. Furthermore, by definition
∂P/∂S < 0 and ∂P/∂D > 0.8
Since coffee can be stored, St ≤ Qt, and farmers can decide to sell at a
later date. Farmers can hold a nonnegative amount of inventory It.9 The
derived demand for coffee faced in the spot market is therefore determined by
subtracting from the total demand all elements that can lower current supply,
including (those affecting) inventory levels. Put differently, if producers face
positive opportunity costs, Ot, to supply in the spot market, they reduce St.
Per bag, these opportunity costs can be expressed as Ot = O (St,Wt), where
Wt represents a vector of factors that negatively affect current supply. It is
assumed that ∂Ot/∂St ≤ 0. Inverse spot market demand can then be written
as
Pt = R (St,Dt)−O (St,Wt) (2)
Alternatively, in equilibrium, we can write spot market supply as
St = S (Pt,Dt,Wt) (3)
In perfect competition, the price of a bag of coffee will equal the marginal
cost of producing coffee C′t. The intersection of S(·) and C′t determines total
long-run supply Q∗. Whenever Qt ≥ Q∗, St = Q∗ and, in the absence of
scarcity, the spot price is determined solely by marginal cost, Pt = C′t. Put
differently, if there is enough supply (relative to demand), the world coffee
price is determined by supply and demand and equals the (relatively stable)
7In Sexton and Zhang (1996), explicit attention is paid to the existence of multiple markets.
Here, we abstract from this distinction without loss of generalization.
8The latter condition is by assumption, and we shall therefore include each element in Dt
either as such or as its inverse, to ensure ∂P/∂D > 0.
9Of course, with positive inventories it is also possible that supply (including sales of inven-
tories) is bigger than production. This does not affect our model or our empirical analysis.
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marginal cost C′t.
As a result, in this case we can write the price of coffee as
(
Pt · φDt
)
+(
Pt ·
(
1− φDt
))
, where
φDt =
C′t
P
(4)
measures the extent to which the price reflects marginal costs. In a perfectly
competitive market, in the simplest case, Pt = C′t, and φDt = 1. Otherwise,
φDt < 1.
In practice, of course, demand and supply shifters can affect the price in the
short run. Whether this is the case, depends on the realizations of Qt, C′t, Dt
and Wt. If we let ρt denote the probability of Pt = C′t, then
Pt = C′t with prob = ρt,
Pt = G (St,Dt,Wt) with prob = 1− ρt.
(5)
So, the expected or fundamental price of coffee at time t can be expressed
as
E (Pt) = P˜t = ρt
[
C′t
]
+ (1− ρt) [G (St,Dt,Wt)] . (6)
If Qt ≥ Q∗ ∀ Qt, then Pt ≡ C′t, ρt ≡ 1, and supply and demand are the only
factors influencing the price at any time. If, however, this is not the case, then
ignoring situations where ρt > 0 leads to an underestimation of the price by
1− φD,Wt , where
φD,Wt =
ρt [C′t]
ρt [C′t] + (1− ρt) [G (St,Dt,Wt)]
(7)
and 0 ≤ φD,Wt ≤ 1.10
Intuitively, as long as there is abundant production (Qt ≥ Q∗), the price is
not driven up from its 'fundamental' value, where it is determined by supply
and demand, and where Pt = C′t. If that is not the case, demand and - in
particular - supply shocks can (temporarily) shift the demand and/or supply
curve and thereby drive up the price, P˜t.
B. Futures market
Old text:
10Note that we speak of an underestimation, since both Dt and Wt have been defined in such
a way that an increase in either results in an increase in demand, respectively an decrease
in supply, i.e., an increase in the price.
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We now consider the existence of a futures market, where farmers can sell
their products and guarantee future prices by engaging in a futures con-
tract.We identify two types of traders on this futures market (CFTC, 2008).
First, there are those that have an underlying position on the spot market, the
so-called 'commercial' traders. Although these traders can of course both in-
crease and decrease their price risk exposure, we shall refer to them as hedgers,
in line with the literature. Also in line with the literature, the 'non-commercial'
traders in this futures market will be referred to as speculators.
For Qt ≥ Q∗, the spot market price is again determined by (spot) supply
and demand, because production is so high that demand and supply shocks
(changes in Dt and Wt) cannot raise the price above marginal costs C′t.
However, for Qt < Q∗t , there exists a per unit surplus, Ut:
Ut =U
(
St,Dt,Wt, C′t,DFt ,WFt
)
,
=H
(
St,Dt,Wt,DFt ,W
F
t
)
− C′t.
(8)
When Qt < Q∗, Xt > 0. Given Dt, Wt, and C′t, Ut is determined by the level
of (spot) supply, St, and factors that shift demand DFt and supply W
F
t in the
futures market. Ut is decreasing in S, for all S ∈ [0, Qt).
Following Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996), given real interest rate r and
deterioration rate δ, the expected value of a bag of coffee in the next period is(
1−δ
1+r
)
times the expected next-period price. The best estimate of that price is
assumed to be the futures price, Ft+n, where n ≥ 1. Without loss of general-
ization, we assume here that n = 1. Since, by definition, ∂Ft+n/∂DFt > 0 and
∂Ft+n/∂WFt > 0, Ut is non-decreasing in D
F
t and WFt . Hence, demand and
supply shifts in the futures market, besides pushing up the futures price, can
reflect future scarcity, which may drive up spot prices as well.11
As a result, H(·) ≥ G(·) and the spot price cannot easily be determined. Put
simply, the surplus can be earned both on the spot and the futures market. As
St is decreased, and more is sold on the futures market, the resulting scarcity
on the spot market raises the surplus Ut.12
Therefore, as Qt decreases, this puts pressure on the price in two ways:
the available surplus increases, and - since the commodity can be stored and
thereby future supply becomes less certain - the futures price is more likely
11The latter can result when the opportunity cost of selling on the spot market is positive, i.e.,
if P <
(
1−δ
1+r
)
Ft+n.
12Keep in mind, however, that the extent to which the farmer can benefit in this manner
depends on the total amount produced; the more coffee is harvested, the less credible is
a reduction of spot supply. In this context, think of the impact of competition among
farmers: as total available harvest per farmer increases, committing to collusion becomes
less credible.
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to increase, and the farmer has more reason to sell on the futures market. As
long as Qt ≥ Q∗, it is still the marginal cost C′t that determines the price, P˜t.
For Qt < Q∗, the effect now depends on the share, γt, of the available surplus
Ut that is earned on the spot market, where γt lies within the unit interval and
of course ∂γ/∂St < 0.
In addition, as is the case in the spot market, factors that shift demand DFt
and supply WFt in the futures market drive up the futures price, and thereby
∂γt/∂DFt > 0 and ∂γt/∂W
F
t > 0, under the assumption that ∂Ft+n/∂D
F
t > 0
and ∂Ft+n/∂WFt > 0, as was the case for the spot market.
13 Hence, γt =
γ
(
St,DFt ,W
F
t
)
, where the latter include demand and supply shifters for the
hedgers.
We can therefore now write14
Pt = C′t with prob = ρt
Pt = C′t + γ (·)
[
H (·)− C′t
]
with prob = 1− ρt,
(9)
where γ (·) = γ (St,DFt ,WFt ) and H (·) = H (St,Dt,Wt,DFt ,WFt ).
Consequently, P˜t can now be expressed as
E (Pt) = ρt
[
C′t
]
+ (1− ρt)
[
C′t + γ (·)
[
H (·)− C′t
]]
where γ (·) = γ (St,DFt ,WFt ) and H (·) = H (St,Dt,Wt,DFt ,WFt ).
From our description of the spot market price setting process above, it is
clear that - in the presence of storable commodities - the existence of futures
market demand and supply shocks can increase the likelihood of a price in-
crease, by driving up H(·) and γ. Therefore, ignoring situations where ρt > 0
and γt > 0 leads to an underestimation of the price by 1− φD,W,Ft , where
φD,W,Ft =
ρt [C′t]
ρt [C′t] + (1− ρt) [C′t + γ (·) [H (·)− C′t]]
(10)
and Ft =
(
DFt ,W
F
t
)
.
Put differently, in the presence of a futures market, there is further potential
for an increase in the spot price, although we by no means assume that the
latter is the case.
As shown in Section II, the debate regarding rising commodity prices does
not focus on the commercial futures market positions referred to above, but
rather on the non-commercial, or speculative positions, i.e., relating to those
parties that have no underlying position in the spot market. As a final ex-
13Note that we assume that r and δ are stable and thereby do not affect γt.
14In their analysis, Sexton and Zhang (1996) parametrize γ, which in their case represents the
farmers’ share.
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tension, therefore, we include DVt and W
V
t , the demand and supply shifters
for these non-commercials. Wrongly excluding this second set results in an
underestimation of the price by 1-φD,W,F,Vt , where Vt =
(
DVt ,W
V
t
)
,
φD,W,F,Vt =
ρt [C′t]
ρt [C′t] + (1− ρt)
[
C′t + γ (·)
[
H˜ (·)− C′t
]] (11)
and H˜ (·) = H˜ (St,Dt,Wt,DFt ,WFt ,DVt ,WVt ). Since, as before, Ut is non-
decreasing in DVt and W
V
t , H˜(·) ≥ H(·).
Summing up, we can conclude from our analysis thus far that
1 ≥ φD,W,F,Vt ≥ φD,W,Ft ≥ φD,Wt ≥ φDt ≥ 0. (12)
As a result, if demand and supply suffice to explain the price of coffee, φD,W,F,Vt =
φD,W,Ft = φ
D,W
t = φ
D
t = 1, and there is no underestimation of the price. On
the other hand, if speculative positions on the futures market are an essential
input in the spot price generation process, then φD,W,F,Vt > φ
D,W,F
t , and not
including these positions leads to an underestimation of the price. Put dif-
ferently, futures market speculative positions then inflate the coffee price by(
φD,W,F,Vt − φD,W,Ft
)
× price.
C. Empirical framework
Implicit in the description of the coffee price production process so far is the
idea that the market transforms the inputs (demand, supply, etc.) into the
output, i.e., the coffee price. The actual process through which the price is
then established is one of price discovery (Gansler, 2009). And the coffee price
is, eventually, established on the coffee market, the market on which physical
quantities of the commodity are bought and sold.
Assuming we can identify the inputs that are relevant to the market, we can
start to identify the production possibility set (PPS) within which the market
operates (Thanassoulis et al., 2008). As the PPS contains all feasible combi-
nations of input and output vectors, the location within the PPS tells us the
extent to which the inputs, at a given point in time, 'produce' the price.
Following Thanassoulis et al. (2008), we can describe the PPS T as:
T =
{
(x, y) ∈ <m+s+ |x can produce y
}
, (13)
where T contains all feasible combinations of inputs x ∈ <m+ and output y ∈
<s+, and both are assumed to be non-negative. In addition, to ensure that
an increase in an input x leads to an increase in output y, we include those
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'inputs' that otherwise would decrease output by their inverse values. Hence,
for example, we include supply as 1/S.
Naturally, what we are interested in is the set of efficient combinations, so
we can measure the inefficiency of the other combinations. Therefore, adding
time subscripts t, we can use the following basic DEA model (Charnes et al.,
1978, 1985):
maxθ,λ θt
Subject to− θtyt +Yλ ≥ 0
xt − Xλ ≥ 0
N1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 1,
(14)
where N1 is a vector of ones, 1 < θt < ∞, and θ− 1 is the proportional increase
in the coffee price (the output y) that can be produced at time t with input
quantities (the market variables) held constant. Inefficiency, χt, is defined as
1−
(
1
θt
)
, and varies between zero and one. Inefficiency is measured against
a convex hull of intersecting planes which tightly envelope the data. Since
the weights λ can sum to a value greater than or equal to one, the model is
characterized by a 'variable returns to scale' (VRS) technology, which ensures
that an inefficient combination of inputs and output is benchmarked against
combinations of similar magnitude.
In line with the theoretical framework, we can now use the model defined
by equation (14) to test whether speculative positions in the futures market
are an essential component of the input set that produces the coffee price.
First, we consider {D}, an input set that consists purely of demand (D) and
inverse supply (1/S), and we estimate χDt . Second, we consider {D,W}, an
input set that consists of demand, supply and a set of variables describing
supply shifters (W). With this input set we estimate χD,Wt . Third, we consider
{D,W, F}, an input set that consists of demand, supply and market condition
variables, as well as the long and inverse short position of commercial futures
market participants, the hedgers (F). This input set allows us to estimate
χD,W,Ft . Fourth, we consider {D,W, F,V}, an extension of {D,W, F} to include
the long and inverse short position of index funds, the speculators (V). Now
we can estimate χD,W,F,Vt , the inefficiency that is present in the price generation
process once all inputs describe above have been included.
In line with our theoretical predictions in equation (12), we can now write
0 ≤ χD,W,F,Vt ≤ χD,W,Ft ≤ χD,Wt ≤ χDt ≤ 1. (15)
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Finally, we consider whether our coffee price production model satisfies the
usual properties of a production function (Chambers, 1988). First, each of our
inputs satisfies a non-negativity constraint, following from the definition of
our inputs. Second, weak essentiality requires that the production of output
is impossible without employing at least one input, which follows from our
inclusion of supply as an input. Third, output (i.e., the coffee price) should be
non-decreasing in each input, in the absence of any congestion problems. In
fact, we have ensured the monotonicity of our production function by defining
each of our inputs x such that if x0 ≥ x1, then f (x0) ≥ f (x1). The most
difficult property to satisfy in the context of the coffee price production model
is concavity, which requires that all marginal products are non-decreasing.
Therefore, in Section V.C, we pay special attention to robustness tests related
to this property. For now, we conclude that our model appears to satisfy most
of the standard properties and proceed to relate the empirical DEA model to
the theoretical framework.
D. Relation between model and empirical framework
To see why the equation (15) must hold, we note here that we can write
χD,W,Ft = 1−
PˆD,W,Ft
Pt
, (16)
where PˆDW,Ft is the predicted ('inefficient') price from employing the model
using demand, supply, demand and supply shifters, as well as hedgers’ posi-
tions, and Pt is the actual price of coffee at time t. Likewise, we can write
χD,W,F,Vt = 1−
PˆD,W,F,Vt
Pt
, (17)
where PˆD,W,F,Vt is the predicted price from employing the model using all
inputs, including speculative futures market demand and supply.
In our theoretical model, we derived the efficiency of the pricing process,
denoted as φ. Now we can also rewrite φD,W,Ft as
φD,W,Ft =
ρtPˆDt
PˆD,W,Ft
=
ρt
(
1− χDt
)
Pt(
1− χD,W,Ft
)
Pt
, (18)
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and we can write φD,W,F,Vt as
φD,W,F,Vt =
ρtPˆDt
PˆD,W,F,Vt
=
ρt
(
1− χDt
)
Pt(
1− χD,W,F,Vt
)
Pt
. (19)
So for φD,W,Ft ≤ φD,W,F,Vt , we can write
ρt
(
1− χDt
)
Pt(
1− χD,W,Ft
)
Pt
≤ ρt
(
1− χDt
)
Pt(
1− χD,W,F,Vt
)
Pt
, (20)
or (
1− χD,W,Ft
)
Pt ≥
(
1− χD,W,F,Vt
)
Pt. (21)
Therefore testing whether φD,W,Ft ≤ φD,W,F,Vt amounts to testing whether
χD,W,Ft ≥ χD,W,F,Vt . (22)
The same logic applies to the other inefficiency scores.
E. Hypotheses
Formally, in case index fund speculation is not part of the coffee price genera-
tion process, we can formulate three hypotheses to test whether or not index
fund speculation has contributed to the coffee price. The first hypothesis can
be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1
H10 : χ
D
t , χ
D,W
t , χ
D,W,F
t = 0;
H1a : χDt , χ
D,W
t , χ
D,W,F
t > 0.
According to this hypothesis, the futures market positions of speculators
are not part of the coffee price generation process. As a result, there is no
inefficiency left once we have selected the correct input set ({D}, {D,W} or
{D,W, F}).
Of course, there may be other, possibly omitted variables that affect the
coffee price. We therefore also test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0;
H2a : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt > 0.
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According to this hypothesis, adding the long and inverse short position of
speculators to the coffee price input set does not result in a decrease in inef-
ficiency. Rejection of this hypothesis would indicate that, at least sometimes,
speculators’ positions explain part of the coffee price.
Clearly, rejection of hypotheses 1 and 2 is evidence in favor of speculators
playing a role in the coffee price generation process. Conditional on this rejec-
tion, we propose a third and more restrictive hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0;
H3a : χ
D,W,F,V
t = 0.
Rejection of this third hypothesis, in addition to rejection of hypotheses
1 and 2, means that once we include speculators’ future market positions,
we have fully accounted for any inefficiencies in the coffee price generation
process. Therefore, rejection of hypothesis 3 provides very strong evidence
that index fund speculation is part of the coffee price generation process.
Before we discuss our data, we address one last important consideration
regarding our hypothesis tests. As our discussion of the literature and the
coffee market has shown, if index fund speculation has had an impact on the
coffee price, there is no reason to assume that this impact can be observed
on average. After all, the discussion so far has pointed out (a) that there may
be many other aspects (possibly covered by our other inputs) that can cause
coffee price jumps, and (b) it may be the case that the effect of index fund spec-
ulation on the coffee price is part of a complex interaction of factors, including
possible price impact, inventory changes, and substitution effects with other
commodities.
When testing our hypotheses, we shall take this into account in several ways.
First, in addition to testing whether each hypothesis can be rejected on aver-
age, we provide more detailed, distribution-based tests. Second, in addition
to tests of the three hypotheses outlined above, we shall relate our results to
the developments in the coffee market, both in a formal and in a more de-
scriptive manner. Third, we shall discuss a series of robustness tests aimed at
challenging some of the assumptions made so far.
IV. Data
Our analysis focuses on explaining the price of Arabica coffee. Arabica is the
prime, broadly traded coffee bean. Its producers try to sell at a relatively
large margin, yet it is also a necessary ingredient in blends. Unfortunately for
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the purpose of our research, there is no 'world' spot price of coffee: coffee is
traded spot on many markets, and available data on spot prices are scarce and
difficult to compare as they may refer to what is charged by either producers
or retailers (Algra, 2009).
To measure the spot price of coffee, we therefore follow the literature (Irwin
and Sanders, 2010), and rely on the fact that the futures price converges to
the spot price as the futures contract reaches its expiration date (Gorton et al.,
2007). Hence, we can closely approximate the spot price by tracking the price
of Arabica at the New York futures market. Here, one to three month futures
are traded on coffee to be delivered in one month to three years time. Futures
are quoted in US dollar cents per pound, and each contract applies to 37,500
pounds of Arabica coffee (ICE, 2009). When the futures contract is very close to
expiration, it occasionally shows extreme fluctuations (Gorton et al., 2007). We
therefore make use of the strong convexity of the convergence path (Gorton
et al., 2007) and measure the coffee price as the average of the price of the
nearest contract.15 Over the sample period 1989 - 2008, the average monthly
price was a little over 102 dollar cents per pound. The price fluctuated between
less than 45 and more than 260 dollar cents per pound. Figure 2(a) shows that
following a decline from 1998 up to 2002, coffee prices have since then showed
a steady rise.
The inputs in {D} are the demand and inverse supply of coffee. Annual
data on coffee production are provided by the Foreign Agricultural Service
of the United States Department of Agriculture (FAS-USDA). Production is
expressed in thousands of bags of 60kg and over the sample period, Arabica
production ranges between 61,389 and 84,903 production units. The produc-
tion of Arabica shows a steady increase over the course of our sample period
(Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States Department of Agriculture,
2009).16 Since most coffee consumption consists of blended coffee, we also in-
clude the production of Robusta coffee beans. Data on Robusta production are
also supplied by the FAS-USDA. Robusta production ranges between 27,146
and 49,117 units over the course of our sample period, with an even steeper in-
crease over time.17 As most coffee is consumed as a blend, coffee consumption
is recorded for Arabica and Robusta jointly.18 Consumption is also expressed
15As a robustness test, we also test using the last price on the second-nearest contract, since
the latter is less susceptible to these fluctuations (see Table 4).
16We observe that these numbers may be underestimated, since they are provided by the
International Coffee Organization (ICO), which may have an interest in underestimating
production in order to put upward pressure on the price of coffee imports.
17In order to match data on prices, production and consumption, we have also run our em-
pirical analysis after converting production numbers to a monthly frequency, by simple
imputation. Results are robust.
18Again, there may be bias in these numbers, as the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
may have an interest in overestimating consumption to drive prices upward.
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in thousands of bags (of 60kg) and ranges between 90,500 and 128,000 units
(Osorio, 2009). Figures 2(a) and 2(c) show that, in 2004/2005 and in 2006/2007,
prices increased despite the fact that supply was higher than demand.
Now we turn to the extended input set {D,W}, which includes W, a num-
ber of supply shifters. The first two are the inventories of coffee importing
countries (GCA, 2009b,c,a) and the inventories of coffee exporting countries
(FAS-USDA, 2009). Changes in these inventories may help clear the market.
Indeed, as expected, Figure 3d shows that reductions in local inventories of
coffee exporting countries have coincided with the increases in coffee prices
in the last decade. In the 1990s, however, reductions in these inventories did
not coincide with coffee price increases. In fact, after the collapse of the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement (ICA) and the ending of the quota system in 1989,
inventories of coffee were held by importing countries instead of producing
countries, as shown in Figure 2(d). This diminished the ability of coffee ex-
porting countries to drive up prices.19
The next supply shifter is the occurrence of frost and droughts (Dijk et al.,
1998). During our sample period, coffee production was seriously affected by
both. In 1994, production dropped due to frost in Brazil, the largest coffee
producer, as the frost caused serious damage to coffee trees.20 Our sample
period also includes two periods of drought, in 1994 and 1999 (see Figure
2(c)). The ICO estimated that 40 percent of these years’ crops in Brazil was
lost because of the drought (International Coffee Organization, 2008).
Since our sample period covers 20 years, supply shifters must include factors
that affect productivity. Here, we include four such factors. First, we include
the yield per hectare in hectograms per hectare (for both Arabica and Robusta,
combined), as provided by the statistical bureau of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) (Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations, 2007).21 From the same source, we then also
use the crop productivity and a broad measure of agricultural productivity.
For each measure, we use the production weighted average of the 17 largest
19In addition, the quantity of coffee produced decreased, which reduced the inventories and
put an upward pressure on the coffee price as well. In 1997, large roasters launched a
new system of supply, called supplier managed inventories. This meant that they reduced
their inventories to cut costs and outsourced the stock management to the large traders,
thus increasing stock mobility and putting downward pressure on prices. Due to supply
problems in countries such as Colombia, Indonesia and Cote d’Ivoire and the late harvest
in Brazil that year, the roasters were not be able to replenish their inventories timely, which
led to acute shortages in the coffee market and triggered panic buying.
20The fact that Robusta is less vulnerable to frost was in the reason for the introduction of
Robusta in Brazil after the frost period of 1976 (International Coffee Organization, 2008).
21As the data provided by FAOSTAT only run until 2007, we use the numbers for 2007 for
2008 as well.
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coffee producing countries. During our sample period, productivity mostly
declined, putting pressure on prices. As a final measure, we include the price
of fertilizer, as the latter constitutes a large part of the production costs of cof-
fee are determined by the price of fertilizer. Over time, fertilizer became more
expensive, thus pushing up prices. A recent study by the International Cof-
fee Organization (2009) states that in the 2007 and 2008, fertilizer represented
between 16.2% and 23.2% of the total costs in Brazil, 23.7% in Columbia and
12.3% in Costa Rica.22
Most coffee is traded in US dollars. As a result, exchange rate fluctuations
can influence the price setting process, both directly and through their effect
on inventories. We include an exchange rate index of the US currency against
a basket of currencies taken from Thomson Datastream.23
Next, we turn to the input set {D,W, F}, which includes demand and sup-
ply from so-called 'commercial' traders. Over our sample period, the market
for coffee futures has become increasingly popular among all kinds of traders
(Crown, 1997). We measure the total trade volume, the number of futures
traded in the market corresponding to the nearest expiring future (i.e., the fu-
ture we use to measure the spot price of coffee). If the trade volume increases,
the liquidity in the market will increase and so the accuracy of the prediction
of the price will increase (CFTC, 2008). Also, we employ a more direct mea-
sure of liquidity in the futures market, in the form of the open interest and
commitment of traders. Open interest relates to the number of outstanding
contracts in the futures market corresponding with the price of the futures
used in our dataset.24 Both variables show a strong increase, in particular in
the second half of our sample period.
Finally, we turn to input set {D,W, F,V}, including speculative positions.
The position held by noncommercial parties in the coffee futures market is sig-
nificant. In 1997, Crown (1997) estimates that the market share of speculators
was around 70 percent. To account for the position of speculators we include
two variables. First, we include the speculative long position, measured as the
long positions held by non-commercial market participants (CFTC, 2008). Sec-
ond, we include the inverse of the speculative short position, to ensure mono-
tonicity for this input. The net position of speculators is shown in Figure 2(e).
22The price of fertilizer has a base date of November 1 1950, and is published monthly by
Thompson Datastream. An important ingredient in fertilizers is oil. In addition, oil is
also included in most commodity indexes, together with coffee. These commodity indexes
are used by speculators as a major guideline for determining their investment strategy
in commodity futures markets. We also ran our analyses including the price of oil as an
additional input variable in the pricing process. Results do not change.
23Alternatively, we considered the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Brazilian Real.
However, since the Real was only introduced again in 1994, it cannot be used for our entire
sample period.
24These positions can be taken by both commercial and non-commercial parties.
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This shows that long positions exceeded short positions, as expected given the
presence of (long-only) index funds, most of the time, but not always. Also,
net positions increased significantly after 2000.
It is difficult to address the full impact of noncommercial traders. The po-
sitions of the different types of traders, published by the CFTC, do not neces-
sarily reflect the true positions of traders, speculators and index speculators.
Some Wall Street banks are exempted from the CFTC’s speculative position
limits. So when noncommercial traders enter into a commodity index swap
with these Wall Street banks, they bypass speculative position limits. In this
way they have unlimited access to commodities futures markets. It is said that
index decorators use this mechanism in 85-90% of their transactions. Also,
noncommercial traders are sometimes wrongly categorized in the CFTC’s clas-
sification scheme (Masters, 2008). In our robustness section, we shall therefore
return to this issue and use a data set that is available for a much smaller
sample period to identify more precisely different types of speculators.
Summing up, we have now defined our four input sets. Each of the input
sets is of course nested in the next. In the next section, we return to our
empirical results.
V. Results
First, we describe our results. This is followed by a description of our hypoth-
esis tests. Next, we provide a more in-depth analysis of the elements that have
contributed to rising coffee prices. Finally, we describe an extensive series of
robustness tests aimed at validating our results.
A. Estimation results
Figure 1 shows the inefficiency distributions. From the figure, we observe
that the inefficiency distributions become more and more skewed as we add
inputs, with lower average inefficiency scores.
Table 2 contains the inefficiency scores resulting from estimating our model
with each of the four input sets, respectively. A number of observations can
be made from the table. First, and as expected, the mean inefficiency drops as
we move from the basic input set containing only demand and supply to the
most elaborate input set, including speculative long and short positions. One
important reason for this, to which we will return in section C, why this is the
case concerns the issue of dimensionality in DEA models: the more variables
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Figure 1: Distributions of inefficiency scores
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are added, the more likely it is that an observation will be efficient. However,
it is worth noting that dimensionality is unlikely to play a role here since the
total number of observations (240) greatly outnumbers the total number of
variables, even in the most elaborate case (with 15 inputs). We observe that
supply-side developments, as captured by W, result in a marked decrease in
inefficiency of more than 30%. The inclusion of commercial traders’ (hedgers’)
positions further reduces inefficiency by 4.5%. Speculative positions contribute
by slicing another 4.4% off overall inefficiency, on average.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
inefficiency (input sets) mean std. dev. min. max.
χDt (supply and demand) 0.417 0.236 0.000 0.797
χD,Wt (+ supply and demand shifters) 0.107 0.133 0.000 0.537
χD,W,Ft (+ hedgers’ positions) 0.062 0.117 0.000 0.537
χD,W,F,Vt (+ speculators’ positions) 0.024 0.067 0.000 0.472
Second, we observe a similar pattern when we look at the standard devia-
tion of inefficiency. The standard deviation is reduced by almost 44%, when we
introduce supply and demand shifters. Subsequently introducing commercial
futures market positions only leads to a further reduction by 12%. However,
introducing speculative positions lowers the standard deviation of inefficiency
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further by almost 43%.
Finally, although the minimum inefficiency is equal to zero in all cases,
the maximum inefficiency drops as we add inputs. Interestingly, adding the
futures market positions of commercial participants does not lower the maxi-
mum inefficiency.
B. Hypothesis tests
Table 3 gives an overview of our main hypothesis tests. As explained in Sec-
tion III.E, we shall test each of our hypotheses in a number of ways. First, we
use a standard t-test, assuming unequal variances.25 The t-tests provide the
most direct tests of our hypotheses. Unfortunately, the t-test is most effective
in case of normally distributed variables, something that obviously does not
apply here as is clear from Figure 1.
Table 3: Hypothesis tests
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 (demand and supply) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 (+ demand and supply shifters) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 (+ hedgers’ positions) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 (+ speculators’ positions) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 (+ speculators’ positions) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Therefore, we also avail of two alternative tests. To test for differences in
efficiency ranks, we apply a Kruskal-Wallis rank test. To operationalize this
test, we generate counterfactual inefficiency distributions as applicable. For
example in testing Hypothesis 1, we generate a series of inefficiency scores
that are always equal to zero. To compare distributions, and test for signifi-
cant differences among distributions, we make use of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test and the counterfactual inefficiency scores we generated for the rank test
(Fiorio, 2004).
From Table 3, we observe that we can reject the null for the first hypothesis:
for each of the first three input sets, the inefficiency that remains in our model
25We use a Welch correction.
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Figure 2: Results
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differs significantly from zero. The null for the second hypothesis is also re-
jected: the decrease in efficiency that results from adding speculators’ long
and short positions to the input set differs significantly from zero. Finally, the
null for the third hypothesis is also rejected: the inefficiency that remains once
we add speculators’ positions is not significantly different from zero.
The strength of our results is reflected graphically in Figure 2(b), which
shows the development of inefficiency scores over the sample period. Clearly,
the most significant decrease in inefficiency comes from adding supply and
demand shifters. With the exception of a few occasions in the early 1990s,
however, almost all of the remaining inefficiency is gone once we include spec-
ulators’ futures market positions.
Summing up, our results so far show clear evidence that speculative trad-
ing in the futures market serves as an input in the spot coffee price. The
effect of speculation on the spot price is spiky, which may explain why other,
mean-variance based analyses have had a hard time measuring it. In the next
subsection, we explore our results further in order to establish that they are
robust, reflect causality and are economically significant.
C. Further analysis
In order to find out whether our results are robust, we carry out a long series of
additional tests. Table 4 contains an overview of these additional analyses, as
well as - when applicable - how they affect our hypothesis tests. The appendix
that accompanies this paper contains a complete and detailed overview of the
robustness tests.
We start, in panel [A], by tackling a number of measurement issues. First,
we change the way we measure the spot price, and find that our hypothesis
tests are qualitative and quantitatively unchanged. When we subsequently
impute those variables that are measured annually, we again find that test re-
sults are unaffected. Next, we make use of more detailed data, collected since
2007 by the CFTC, regarding the composition of speculative long and short
positions. When we focus specifically on index funds, we find that when the
net position of index funds increases, (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ) × price decreases,
in line with our second hypothesis. We then do the same using the Disaggre-
gated Commitments of Traders reports, collected by the CFTC since 2006, and
we find a strong negative correlation between inefficiency and the position of
swap dealers, who have the least rapport with the underlying fundamentals
in the spot market. Our final two robustness tests in panel [A] concern the
oil price. Since oil is not only an input in the production of many agricultural
commodities, including coffee, but also the main commodity in commodity
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index futures, we have so far refrained from including the oil price in our in-
put sets. As a robustness test, we now include it, and find not only that this
does not affect our tests results, but also that the substitution effect that we
discuss later on in this subsection is still present.
In panel [B], we tackle the assumptions underlying our model. As explained
earlier, we apply a production model to a price discovery setting, thereby im-
plicitly assuming that the usual characteristics of an input-output relationship
hold. Now, we relax the assumptions underlying our model in order to find
out how this affects our hypothesis test results. We start with the assumption
of free disposability of inputs and convexity. In order to relax these assump-
tions, we re-run our analysis using a Full Disposable Hull (FDH) model, in-
stead of a DEA model. Our test results are still valid, with the exception of
Hypothesis 3, which indeed seems to suffer from the dimensionality issues
that sometimes plague FDH results (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). Our next two
robustness tests concern the efficiency measure itself, which is assumed to be
radial and output-oriented. Relaxing both assumptions, respectively using an
additive measure and non-oriented efficiency, does not have much of an effect.
The same holds when we include, to the extent possible, inputs as ratios (e.g.
demand divided by supply) in order to reduce dimensionality issues. Using
a non-increasing returns to scale model and dropping most of the demand
and supply shifters also has no effect. In line with our theoretical model, we
find some evidence that an increase in the futures price Granger-causes higher
inventories for importers, and that a good harvest results in more inefficiency.
In panel [C], we take a closer look at the way in which we test our hy-
potheses. We start by considering the fact that our inefficiency distributions
are highly skewed, and test each of our hypothesis on the tails of each dis-
tribution, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As expected, this approach does
not work for Hypothesis 2, which - given that it concerns the differences be-
tween two inefficiency distributions - does not suffer from skewness prob-
lems. For the other hypothesis tests, results are robust. In line with Irwin
and Sanders (2010) and others, we find evidence that increased speculation
increases the volatility of spot prices. Next, we randomize the speculative
long and short positions, preserving the overall distributions of each, but
distributing each position randomly over the sample period. If speculation
does not cause the decrease in efficiency, then we expect our null hypothesis
not to be rejected, which is indeed the case (at the 1% level). Our next ro-
bustness test concerns the rise of index fund speculation: graphical evidence
suggests that (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price, the part of the price which, accord-
ing to our model, can be attributed to speculation, does not start to co-move
with long futures positions until after 2000, i.e., when interest fund specula-
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Table 4: Robustness tests
Issue Additional analysis H10 H
2
0 H
3
0
[A
]
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t (1) Spot price measurement Use second most nearby futures contract
√ √ √
(2) Frequency Imputation of annual variables
√ √ √
(3) Index speculators New variable for speculators n.a. n.a. n.a.
(4) Managed funds New variable for managed funds n.a. n.a. n.a.
(5) Oil price as an input Include oil price and re-run hypotheses tests
√ √ √
(6) Oil price as an input Include oil price and re-run [E.1] (substitution effect) n.a. n.a. n.a.
[B
]
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
(1) Free disposability and convexity FDH estimations
√ √
X
(2) Radial expansion Additive efficiency measure
√ √ √
(3) Output orientation Non-oriented efficiency measure
√
X
√
(4) Scaling and dimensionality Apply ratios
√ √ √
(5) Returns to scale non-increasing
√ √ √
(6) Dimensionality Drop most demand-/supply-shifters
√ √ √
(7) Hoarding Inventories increase as a result of future price? n.a. n.a. n.a.
(8) Good harvest χ is high when there is a good harvest n.a. n.a. n.a.
[C
]
H
yp
ot
he
se
s (1) Tail effects Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on tails
√
X
√
(2) Volatility test Welch test on std. dev of inefficiencies n.a. n.a. n.a.
(3) Spurious correlation randomizing speculative long and short position X X X
(4) Demand/supply shift Market development futures market n.a. n.a. n.a.
(5) Fit using {D,W,F,V} Figure C5.a n.a. n.a. n.a.
[D
]
C
au
sa
lit
y
(1) Significance Bootstrapped χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , Figure A.1c n.a. n.a. n.a.
(2) VAR analysis Impulse response of coffee price n.a. n.a. n.a.
(3) VAR analysis Variance of impulse response of coffee price n.a. n.a. n.a.
(4) VAR analysis Normality tests using coffee price n.a. n.a. n.a.
(5) VAR analysis Impulse response of (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ) ×
coffee price
n.a. n.a. n.a.
(6) VAR analysis Variance of impulse response of χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt n.a. n.a. n.a.
(7) VAR analysis Normality tests using (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price n.a. n.a. n.a.
(8) Causality Granger causality tests n.a. n.a. n.a.
(9) Lags 6 month lag in DEA model (maximum between har-
vests)
√ √ √
(10) Lags Impulse response for 1 year (cycle of min. 2 harvests) n.a. n.a. n.a.
[E
]
Po
lic
y
(1) Substitution effects With S&P and price of oil, Figure E.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(2) Substitution effects Changes in price of oil, Table ?? n.a. n.a. n.a.
(3) Market impact Figure E.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(4) Impact on Fair trade Figure E.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(5) Consumer surplus Figure E.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Significance tested at 1% level; Based on t-test.
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tion started taking off. A one percent increase in these long positions reduces
(χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price by 0.42%. Finally, we compare the actual price of
coffee with the price that, according to our results, would prevail without fu-
tures speculation, and show that the model tracks the actual price remarkably
well.
In panel [D], we try to tackle the issue of causality. We start by present-
ing the bootstrapped distributions of χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , in order to verify that
measurement error does not affect our tests for hypothesis 2. Next, we follow
the approach taken by Irwin and Sanders (2010), and estimate VAR models
using the spot price of coffee and the long futures positions. Our initial re-
sults are in line with Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Irwin et al. (2009): the
cumulative impulse response of the spot price to a one standard deviation
change in the long futures position is zero, with a very large confidence inter-
val. However, variance decomposition of that same impulse response shows
that the variance of the spot price does react. When we repeat the VAR anal-
ysis, instead using the part of the spot price that, according to our model,
is explained by speculation, the results change. The impulse response is now
positive, albeit still not significant, and the variance is no longer affected. More
interesting are the Granger causality tests from both VAR analyses: whereas
initially, neither spot nor futures position Granger-cause one another, the fu-
tures position does Granger-cause the part of the spot price that is explained
by speculation. Further robustness analyses reveal that our hypothesis test re-
sults are robust for the inclusion of all inputs with a lag (of six months), in line
with our model where inventory adjustments should play an important role.
Interestingly, the six month cumulative impulse response of the part of the
spot price that is explained by speculation is now not only positive, but also
significantly different from zero. Summing up, the results in panel [D] pro-
vide additional evidence that speculation is not only an input in our model,
but has indeed caused part of the changes in the spot price.
Finally, in Panel [E] we investigate a number of policy-related issues. We
find evidence of a substitution effect: as the relative returns on oil compared
with other commodities in the index drop, commodity futures index funds
shift more of their investments into other commodities, strengthening the
speculative channel we identify in this paper. Further analysis shows that
this effect is particularly likely to occur in the presence of steep oil price in-
creases. Together, these results contribute to the complex relationship between
oil prices and the prices of other commodities, such as coffee. An increase
in the price of oil can increase the spot price of commodities, since oil is an
input in the production of most commodities. However, a decline in the price
of oil does not necessarily have the opposite effect: as a result of the substitu-
tion effect that is briefly described above, such a decline may actually result in
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an increase in other commodities’ futures prices, thereby pushing spot prices
up instead of reducing them. Next, we find evidence in support of the market
impact of long speculators in the coffee futures market. Fair trade has not how-
ever been affected, because the speculation has mostly influenced spot prices
when they were well below the minimum guaranteed fair trade price. Finally,
using some basic assumptions, we estimate that the loss in consumer surplus
as a result of speculation averages approximately 20%, but varies widely over
time. IN summary, these additional results provide further evidence of the
impact speculation has had on both producers and consumers of coffee.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new approach to measuring the possible
impact of futures speculation on spot commodity prices. We advocate the
use of a non-parametric, highly flexible empirical model for measuring this
impact, in order to account for possible non-linearity in the transmission from
futures to spot market.
Empirical results for the coffee market show that most of the changes in spot
prices can be attributed to shifts in demand and - in particular - supply. Fail-
ure to account properly for these inputs in the coffee price generation process
may lead to serious overestimation of the effects of speculation. Nevertheless,
speculation is an important part of the coffee price generation process. The
effect of speculation on the coffee price is indeed spiky, which explains why
traditional, mean-variance based methods have failed to identify it. However,
it is also significant, both statistically and economically. An extensive robust-
ness analysis confirms the validity of our results, and, within the limitations
posed by the data, we are able to establish causality.
It is important to bear in mind the complexity of the process that is described
in this paper and captured by our empirical analysis. Contrary to many other
studies, we find that futures speculation does have an impact on spot prices.
However, we also argue and establish empirically that this impact depends
crucially on other aspects, including inventories, the futures market micro-
structure, harvest sizes, the price elasticity of demand and many other factors
that are included in our analysis. On occasion, as described in this paper,
these factors align to create a 'perfect storm'that temporarily pushes up the
spot price of coffee. Although futures speculation is an important factor in
the mix, our results imply that we should not expect miracles from the futures
trading caps for speculators currently being proposed in many legislatures.
Rather, our results suggest that limiting the negative consequences of futures
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speculation without harming the liquidity that speculators bring to the futures
market will require a broader set of measures.
What do our results imply for other commodities? Compared with most
other commodities, coffee is widely traded and produced by many countries,
and the natural requirements for coffee production (elevation, a dry season)
mean that climate change may affect it more than is the case with many other
commodities. All of these elements suggest that speculation can be expected to
be at least as important as an input for other commodities. However, coffee is
also relatively easy to store and importing countries’ inventories are at a low
level, suggesting the pass-through from futures to spot market is relatively
easy. Ultimately, therefore, a definitive answer to this question is left open for
further research.
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Appendix of Futures Speculation and Commodity
Prices
A.1. Spot price measurement
As explained in our description of the data, we measure the spot price of coffee
by taking the futures price just before expiration, thus relying on the fact that
the latter converges to the former. In practice, however, the futures price occa-
sionally shows some wide swings in the days before expiration, before settling
at the spot price (Gorton et al., 2007). In order to rule out the possibility that
such swings affect our findings, we repeat our analysis here with a different
measure for the spot price: instead, we take the second-nearest futures price.
This price is generally much less susceptible to the types of swings we just
described.
Figure A.1: Price development
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Table A.1: Tests with alternative price
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure A.1 compares our original measure for the price with the new mea-
sure, and shows that the resulting prices are very, very similar indeed. Table
A.1 repeats our hypotheses tests, and finds that results do not change when
we use the alternative measurement of the spot price.
A.2. Frequency
As is clear from our description of the data, our analysis is characterized by
a mismatch of the frequency at which we observe variables. This type of
mismatch is highly typical of a study that combines high-frequency financial
data with lower-frequency production data (Zhou, 1996).
In order to asses whether this mismatch affects our results, we repeat our
analysis with imputed values for variables with a lower frequency, and in-
terpolate these variables. The variables that are interpolated in this way are
the production of both Arabica and Robusta, total coffee consumption, in-
ventories held by importers and exporters and agricultural productivity. Not
A-1
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shown here are additional interpolations controlling for seasonality as results
do not change materially.
Figure A.2: χ with imputation
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Table A.2: Tests with imputation
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS
= Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure A.2 shows the resulting inefficiency distributions. As is to be ex-
pected, inefficiency distributions become more skewed. However, from Table
A.2 we learn that none of the hypotheses tests is affected by this change.
A.3. Measurement of index funds
In our analysis, we can accurately distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial futures market positions. However, part of our argument regard-
ing the impact of the latter on spot prices hinges on the particular behavior
of a subset of non-commercial traders: index funds. It is these funds that are
most likely to invest long-long, rolling over positions, largely ignoring funda-
mentals and generating substantial increases in - particularly - long futures
positions. Since 2007, the CFTC has collected more detailed data on non-
commercial traders, on a quarterly basis. Unfortunately, the resulting series is
too short to rerun our analysis. We therefore present a more modest analysis.
Figure A.3: χ and index funds
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Table A.3: Correlations
∆× price net long short equiv
∆× price 1.0000
net 0.0853 1.0000
long 0.1590 0.9879∗ 1.0000
short -0.2349∗ -0.7826∗ -0.8541∗ 1.0000
equiv 0.1720 0.2503 0.1435 0.0292 1.0000
Notes: ∆ × price=(χD,Wt − χD,W,F,Vt ) × price; net,
long, short refer to notional positions; equiv refers
to futures equivalent, net position; ∗= significant at
least at 10% level.
Figure A.3 shows the development of the net position of index funds, com-
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pared with the development of (χD,Wt − χD,W,F,Vt )× price.26 In line with our
second hypothesis, we expect the latter to be high, when the former is also
high. Indeed, this is what the Figure shows. The graph is similar when we use
only long positions. In Table A.3, we correlate (χD,Wt − χD,W,F,Vt )× price with
index funds’ positions. As expected, the correlation is positive/negative with
the long/short positions of index funds. Not surprisingly, the correlation with
the net position of index funds is also positive. Finally, the correlation with
the futures equivalent position including delta-adjusted options - estimates of
the contracts that would have been closed if there had not been offsets - is also
positive. Not surprisingly, given the low number of observations, correlations
are for the most part not significant.
A.4. Managed funds
From 2006, the CFTC has published the Commitments of Traders (COT) re-
port, which contains a breakdown of open interest positions above the mini-
mum reporting levels of the CFTC. These data are available on a higher weekly
frequency. As these are all positions, including those of commercial traders,
we relate them to χD,W.
Figure A.4 plots the long positions of commercial traders, the long positions
of swap funds27 and χD,W. In line with our first hypothesis, we expect to see
no relation with the latter and a negative relation with the former positions.
This is in fact more or less what we observe.
Figure A.4: χ and managed funds
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Table A.4: Correlations
χD,W prod funds swap other
χD,W 1.0000
prod 0.2640 1.0000
funds 0.4463∗ -0.2384 1.0000
swap -0.5756∗ -0.1201 -0.00913 1.0000
other -0.4592∗ 0.0121 -0.8076∗ 0.0603 1.0000
Notes: prod, funds, swap and other re-
fer to change in long positions of produc-
ers/merchants/processors/users, managed funds,
swap dealers and other reportables, respectively; ∗=
significant at least at 10% level.
26We compare with the inefficiency excluding all futures positions, in order to avoid measure-
ment of commercial versus non-commercials.
27In the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (COT) reports, there are swap dealers that
are not involved in index trading. These traders are not included as index traders in the
Commodity Index Trader (CIT) supplement that the CFTC publishes since January 2007,
and that was used in the previous subsection. Institutional investors that do not operate
via a swap dealer are classified here as managed money or as other reportables.
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Table A.4 provides somewhat more robust evidence. In this table, we cor-
relate χD,W with the long positions of all different types of investors in the
Disaggregated Commitments of Traders reports. Correlation with the long
positions of 'producers' is positive, but not significant. Correlation with man-
aged funds is also positive. The negative correlation is strongest, as expected,
for swap dealers, who have the least rapport with the underlying fundamen-
tals in the spot market.
A.5. Oil price as an input: hypotheses tests
In our analyses in the paper, we do not include the oil price as a direct input.
One reason for not doing so, is the fact that other variables (the dollar exchange
rate, price of fertilizer) already capture quite some part of the effects of oil
price changes. Also, in our policy section E, we test for substitution effects:
the mechanics of index funds can imply that low oil prices (or small oil price
changes) create the conditions for coffee futures market positions to affect the
spot price of coffee - in the absence of momentum in the oil futures market.
Figure A.5: χ with oil price as input
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Table A.5: Tests with oil price as input
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
In Figure A.5, we show the inefficiency distributions after including the oil
price as an extra input in our data envelopment analysis model. As expected,
with one extra input, the distributions are somewhat more skewed. Hypothe-
ses tests in Table A.5 confirm the results from the paper for all hypotheses.
A.6. Oil price as an input: substitution effect still there?
In a later section in this Appendix, we formally investigate the above substitu-
tion effect. We find that inefficiency indeed is high when the oil price is low,
and vice versa. There is, however, no correlation with the S&P500, suggesting
that there is indeed some substitution within the index.
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In Figure A.6, we repeat this analysis, by estimating the kernel density of
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , conditional on the price of oil and the S&P500, respectively,
after including the oil price as an input in the efficiency estimate. Again, the
graph reflects a substitution effect. The correlation analysis in Table A.6 sug-
gests the same.
Figure A.6: Substitution with oil price as
input
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Table A.6: Correlations
∆ oil price S&P500 χD,W,Ft χ
D,W,F,V
t
∆ 1.0000
oil price-0.0097 1.0000
S&P500 0.0585 0.5596∗ 1.0000
χD,W,Ft 0.8064
∗ -0.0863 -0.0730 1.0000
χD,W,F,Vt 0.1510
∗ -0.1327∗ -0.1920∗ 0.7064∗ 1.0000
Notes: ∆ = χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ; ∗= significant at least
at 10% level.
B.1. Free disposability of inputs and outputs
In a traditional production analysis, true production possibilities are assumed
to be convex. Since the observed input-output combinations are assumed to
be a representative sample from these true possibilities, the same holds for
these combinations. In the context of our analysis, convexity can reasonably
be questioned. To do so, we estimate our production model using a Free
Disposable Hull (FDH) model.
FDH relies only on the assumption that observed production possibilities
satisfy free disposability: it is always possible to waste inputs. With this waste,
FDH can in fact be considered as an approximation of the traditional produc-
tion analysis, with congestion.28 With this adjustment, the resulting efficiency
scores can still be interpreted as Pareto-Koopmans or Debreu-Farrell measures
of technical efficiency (Cherchye et al., 2000).
In light of our approach, applying FDH does have one drawback: it is some-
what more sensitive to dimensionality issues, which can lead to a bias in in-
efficiency scores (Park et al., 2000). Figure B.1 indeed shows more skewed
inefficiency distributions, with the exception of χD,W,F,Vt . In Table B.1, only
the results for our third hypothesis test change significantly, demonstrating
that with free disposability, our input set {D,W, F,V} no longer reduces in-
efficiency to zero. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for our second hypothesis
28In light of our coffee price model, congestion can be seen as late price discovery.
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suggests that we can no longer reject the null that χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt = 0.
However, the difference is significant again when evaluated above mean or
median (i.e. in the tail).
Figure B.1: Distributions with FDH
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Table B.1: Hypotheses tests with FDH
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0004 0.0001 0.3930
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0088 0.4758 0.9940
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
B.2. Radial expansion
In economic analyses, we are typically not only interested in the direction of
effects, but certainly also in their magnitude. In our DEA model, we rely
on a radial measure of inefficiency: our Debreu-Farrell measure quantifies
the resulting relative efficiency. But what is the magnitude of the maximum
absolute decreases in prices? In order to find out, we re-estimate our model,
this time using an additive inefficiency measure that quantifies the maximum
slack in the price of coffee.
Of course, here too, the introduction of a new methodology has its draw-
backs: the resulting Koopmans inefficiency is no longer invariant with respect
to units of measurement.
Figure B.2: Distributions with additive in-
efficiency
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Table B.2: Tests with additive inefficiency
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
We recall from our descriptive statistics that the price of coffee is on average
approximately 102 dollar cents per pound. In Figure B.2 we show the distri-
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butions of the additive inefficiency scores, now comparable to the price. Table
B.2 is testament to the fact that hypotheses test results remained unaffected,
even for hypothesis 3.
B.3. Output orientation
Our additive inefficiency measure in the previous paragraphs shares one im-
portant feature with the inefficiency measures introduced in the paper: both
are output (i.e., price) oriented. But what if in reality not everything is aimed
at increasing prices? After all, some of our 'inputs' can surely not be said not
to aim to maximize prices; think for example of consumers.
To see how robust our results are to relaxing the pure focus on output ori-
entation, we can estimate the same additive efficiency as in the previous sub-
section, but now in a non-oriented manner: effectively what we then do is
to weight reductions in inputs and increases in output, using the weights re-
sulting from the non-oriented Pareto-Koopmans DEA model (Charnes et al.,
1985).
Figure B.3: Distributions with
non-oriented inefficiency
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Table B.3: Hypotheses tests with non-
oriented inefficiency
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0006 0.0001 0.0020
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure B.3 shows the resulting inefficiency distributions, which are very
similar to what we saw in Figure B.2. The same holds true for the hypothesis
test results in Table B.3.
B.4. Scaling and additivity
In estimating our DEA model, we assume that inputs are additive and can
be scaled: a slightly lower set of inputs results in a slightly lower output,
i.e., price. These assumptions manifest themselves in our choice of a constant
returns to scale DEA model (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011), a choice that we address
in the next subsection.
APPENDIX TO FUTURES SPECULATION AND COMMODITY PRICES A-8
For now, we test the importance of these assumptions in a very simple,
rather intuitive manner: a number of our inputs can in fact be argued not to
affect our output through their absolute size, but rather through their relative
size compared with another input. The most obvious examples are demand
and supply. Other examples include the long and short positions of specula-
tors.
Likewise, other inputs can be argued to affect the output (price) in the same
manner. Examples include inventories of importers and exporters, yield, crop
and agricultural productivity, and the total trading volume and open inter-
est/commitment of hedgers.
Therefore, as a robustness test, we include the first set of inputs as ratios,
and the second set of inputs as sums, thus reducing the potential for dimen-
sionality issues, somewhat relaxing the scaling assumption, at the expense of
increasing our reliance on the additivity assumption.
Figure B.4: Distributions with ratios
and sums
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Table B.4: Tests with ratios and sums
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure B.4 shows the impact, at first glance rather profound, on the inef-
ficiency distributions. It is important to note, however, that one inefficiency
distribution remains largely unaffected: χD,W,F,Vt . Table B.4 shows that hy-
potheses test results still remain unaffected.
B.5. Returns to scale
In the previous subsection, we took a simple, but somewhat unusual approach
to relaxing assumptions regarding scaling. Here, we proceed with a more cus-
tomary approach: we relax our constraint on the curvature of the efficient price
frontier, and estimate a non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) DEA model.
Inefficiency distributions in Figure B.5 tell a similar story as in Figure B.4:
with the exception of χD,W,F,Vt , average inefficiency increases significantly, as
more density is shifted towards higher inefficiency values. Table B.5 shows
that hypothesis test results are unaffected.
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Figure B.5: Distributions with non-
increasing returns to scale
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Table B.5: Tests with non-increasing
returns to scale
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
B.6. Dimensionality
In our theory section, as well as in our empirical analysis, we have emphasized
both demand and supply, and factors that shift demand and supply. We think
including inputs that reflect the latter enhances the validity of our model’s re-
sults. However, our choice here can also be questioned, on two grounds. First,
in so doing, we have extended the set of inputs, thereby possibly increasing
dimensionality issues: with too many variables, 'efficiency-by-default' is a se-
rious possibility. Second, we have included factors that are strictly speaking
supposed to reflect changes in (the productivity of) inputs in an input-output
analysis.
Therefore, as a robustness test, we now estimate our model with fewer con-
trol variables. Of the variables included in W, we retain only our measures of
frost and drought, as well as the inventories of importers and exporters.
Figure B.6: Distributions with fewer in-
puts
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Table B.6: Tests with fewer inputs
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure B.6 contains the resulting inefficiency distributions. Clearly, the omit-
ted variables account for an important part of the inefficiency. However, as is
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clear from the distribution of χD,W,F,Vt , including the speculative positions re-
sults in a very large reduction of that inefficiency. The latter is confirmed by
H30 in Table B.6, which also shows that the other hypothesis results remain
intact.
B.7. Hoarding and future price developments
One of the more subtle implications of our theoretical model is the notion
that one way in which future price developments may have an impact on the
spot market and spot price is through hoarding: as the futures price increases,
building up an inventory becomes more attractive, ceteris paribus.
The argument here is intricate: who exactly benefits from building up the
inventory? Is it the farmer, who can afford, given a good harvest, to sell
less on the spot market in order to receive the higher futures price? Or is it
an intermediary, who either does the same, or tries to guard herself against
such an increase by bumping up her inventory. A cautious preliminary an-
swer is given in Figure B.7 and Table B.7. As the Figure shows, inventories
of exporters have been shrinking since the early 1990s. Possible additional
explanations for these declines include high price variability (Dehn, 2000) and
low interest rates (Frankel, 2006), both acting to reduce the collateral value of
inventories.
Figure B.7: Hoarding?
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Table B.7: Granger causality hoarding
left-hand side right-hand side χ2 df Prob >χ2
exporters futures price 4.6304 6 0.592
futures price exporters 4.3863 6 0.625
importers futures price 6.6043 6 0.359
futures price importers 15.993 6 0.014
Notes: exporters = exporters’ inventory; im-
porters = importers’ inventory; futures price of
3rd closest contract, measured at beginning of
month.
Table B.7 reports results from a Granger causality test, conducted after run-
ning a straightforward VAR model (with a lag structure of up to 6 months).
From the Table, we learn that the futures price indeed Granger-causes a change
in inventories (the impulse response, now shown, is positive) for importers.
For exporters, no effect is found.
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B.8. Good harvest
Another subtle implication from our model is the impact of production on the
link between the futures market and the spot price. The argument here is as
follows: when producers are faced with poor harvests, they simply cannot af-
ford not to sell spot. And after a big harvest, producers have a strong incentive
not to sell spot, but cannot expect to gain much by doing this.
Therefore, the model suggests that the link between the futures market and
the spot price is particularly strong when there is a relatively good harvest.
Figure B.8 shows the development of both χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt and the differ-
ence, at any time, between production and consumption of coffee (plotted here
using a kernel density estimator). In line with the model, we expect increases
in inefficiency to occur when there is excess production. We note however that,
in our empirical setup, an increase in production itself is expected to lower the
price (since we include 1/production as an input).
Figure B.8: Excess production and
inefficiency
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Table B.8: Formal tests
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt mean std. dev. obs.
production-consumption<=med. 0.0256 0.0606 120
production-consumption>med. 0.0519 0.1039 120
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H20 : ∆χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0172 0.0112 n.a.
Notes: med.=median; ∆χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt = discrete
difference between value for both groups; p-values
shown for both tests; KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test;
KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
To test whether the effect is still significant, we split the distribution of the
difference between production and consumption at the median. We then test
whether χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt is significantly higher when 'excess production' is
above the median. The results from this test are included in Table B.8 and
confirm that inefficiency is indeed significantly higher.29
C.1. Tail effects
When we introduced our hypothesis tests, we emphasized the importance of
not solely testing for an average effect of speculation on the spot price. As a
result, we used both parametric (student t) and non-parametric (Krusal-Wallis,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov) tests for our hypotheses.
29Note that we cannot perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test here, since the split at the
median means that the distributions are no longer continuous over time.
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For robustness purposes, we now take things one step further, by testing
whether our hypotheses hold up once we ignore the more extreme values
further out in the tail of the inefficiency distributions.
In most of the cases presented here, the bulk of the density of inefficiency
is located relatively close to zero. But what about the most extreme inefficien-
cies? Figure C.1 illustrates this, by plotting all inefficiency distributions when
χDt is above its median.
Figure C.1: Tail effects
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Table C.1: Hypotheses tests without the
tail
Hypothesis 5th 25th 50th
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 5th (25th,
50th) means that 5th (25th, 50th) highest per-
centile of the inefficiency distributions is ignored.
For H20 , we base the cut-off on χ
D,W,F
t .
In Table C.1, we test each of our hypotheses after ignoring the inefficiencies
above the 5th, 25th and 50th highest percentile respectively, using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests. As is evident from the Table, the hypothesis tests are highly
robust to the exclusion of extreme values. Note that this is particularly true
for our second hypothesis, where we test the difference between inefficiency
without and with the inclusion of speculators’ positions.
C.2. Volatility tests
Our paper focuses on the possible effect of futures market speculation on the
level of spot prices. But what about spot price volatility? Empirical evidence
with respect to volatility increases is much more prevalent (Irwin and Sanders,
2010).
In order to test whether our approach confirms that futures market specula-
tion has increased spot price volatility, we perform two sets of additional tests.
In the first set, reported in Table C2.a, we perform a Welch test on the equality
of variances on two prices: the original price of coffee, and the price of coffee
we derive by excluding the effect of speculation. The test indeed confirms that
we cannot reject the hypothesis that speculation has increased the volatility of
the price of coffee.
In the second set, reported in Table C2.b, we test for volatility differences
between each of our inefficiency measures. The interpretation of results is
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straightforward: with each extension of the set of inputs in our model, the
volatility of the resulting inefficiency score drops.
Table C2.a: Variance test on price
Descriptives
price priceno spec
std. dev. 38.507 39.742
Tests
f Pr(F > f )
price - priceno spec 0.939 0.000
Notes: std. dev. = standard deviation; F-test for vari-
ance; priceno spec= 1− (χD,W,Ft −−χD,W,F,Vt )]× price.
Table C2.b: Variance test on inefficiency
Descriptives
χDt χ
D,W
t χ
D,W,F
t χ
D,W,F,V
t
std. dev. 0.236 0.133 0.117 0.067
Tests
f Pr(F > f )
χDt − χD,Wt 3.138 0.000
χD,Wt − χD,W,Ft 1.312 0.018
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt 3.040 0.000
Notes: std. dev. = standard deviation; F-test for vari-
ance.
C.3. Spurious correlation
Some of the robustness tests we have carried out so far have been aimed at
ensuring that we are not falling into a dimensionality trap which would result
in lower inefficiency scores purely because of adding more inputs, rather than
because of the impact of those inputs on the price.
Here, we continue along those lines, but in a somewhat different manner:
we randomize the positions of futures market participants, by redistributing
the actual positions in a random manner across our sample period. In doing
so, we explore whether our inefficiency scores have been the result of spurious
correlation.
Figure C.3: Distributions with ran-
domized futures positions
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Table C.3: Hypothesis tests with ran-
domized futures positions
Descriptives mean std. dev. obs.
χD,W,Ft 0.0622 0.0075 240
χD,W,Frt 0.0367 0.0052 240
χD,W,F,Vt 0.0235 0.0043 240
χD,W,Fr,Vrt 0.0194 0.0041 240
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
χD,W,Ft = χ
D,W,Fr
t 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
χD,W,F,Vt = χ
D,W,Fr,Vr
t 0.1734 0.0277 0.0000
Notes; KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Figure C.3 shows the resulting inefficiency distributions, both for χD,W,Ft
and χD,W,F,Vt - the original inefficiency scores - and χ
D,W,Fr
t and χ
D,W,Fr,Vr
t -
with randomized futures positions respectively for hedgers, and for hedgers
and speculators.
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In Table C.3, we formally test whether randomizing futures positions has an
effect on the inefficiency scores. If futures positions are indeed strategic, we
may expect inefficiency scores with randomized positions to be significantly
lower. In the Table, we learn that average inefficiency indeed drops once we
randomize futures positions, both for χD,W,Ft and for χ
D,W,Fr,V
t . The difference
however, is only significant for χD,W,Ft : put simply, these results show that
speculators’ futures market positions are indeed not spuriously correlated with
spot prices.
C.4. Likelihood of demand/supply shift
An important ingredient in our theoretical model is the inclusion of inputs
that cause a demand or supply shift, thus affecting the spot price of coffee.
Assuming there is a channel from the futures market to the spot market, a
demand or supply shift in the former market still does not have to affect the
price in the latter. To see why, consider a simultaneous increase in demand and
supply of coffee futures: the result is an increase in the equilibrium number of
futures traded, but the price of coffee futures would be unaffected, as would
be the spot price of coffee.
As it happens, most commodity futures markets have gone through big
structural changes over the past twenty years (Masters, 2008). Not only have
volumes increased tremendously, the composition of short and - in particular
- long positions has changed as well. In the beginning of our sample period,
more than two thirds of long futures positions for most commodities were
held by commercial parties. By the end of our sample period, these parties
held less than one third in many markets, the remainder of the demand for
long futures coming from non-commercial participants (Masters, 2008).
We can use the fact that commodity futures index trading did not become
very popular until the beginning of this century, as an identification mecha-
nism, to find out more about the relationship between futures and spot market
developments.
In Figures C4.a and C4.b, we plot long and short positions in the futures
market for the first part of our sample period (1990-2000) and the last part
(2001-2009), respectively. The most important change, going from the former
graph to the latter, is the rise of futures index trading, resulting mainly in the
increase in the demand for long futures. From Figure C4.a, we observe no
clear pattern. Things change when we turn to Figure C4.b, where we observe
a coincidence between the increase in long futures held by noncommercial
participants and χD,W,Ft −χD,W,F,Vt , the part of the coffee price that is attributed
to speculation.
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Figure C4.a: 1990-2000
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Figure C4.b: 2000-2009
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To get a feel for the economic significance of the pass-through from fu-
tures to spot market, we regressed χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt on the (3-month lagged)
long and short positions of non-commercials, in a simple regression. Both
positions have a significant coefficient, which - as expected - is positive for
short and negative for long positions. Adjusted R2 for the regression is 0.04.
Considering the elasticities, we find that a one percent increase in the long
position decreases χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt by 0.42%. Likewise, an increase in the
short position of non-commercials of one percent results in a 0.58% increase
in χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt . Since the latter is still expressed as a percentage of the
price, we can interpret both elasticities in a fairly straightforward manner.
C.5. Model fit
The final item on our list of robustness checks related to our hypothesis tests
concerns the fit of our model. Results from testing our third hypothesis in
particular suggest that our analysis does not suffer from an omitted variable
problem: once we include noncommercial futures market positions, the spot
price of coffee is 'fully' explained.
Since we use a non-parametric model and emphasize the 'spikiness' of the
main effect we are interested in, using a least squares measure of fit (such as
R2) is not obvious. As a simple robustness check, we nevertheless regress the
actual price of coffee on the price with speculation. The resulting R2adj is 0.99,
and the coefficient for the latter variable is of the order of 0.9676 with a t-value
of 126.99.
In Figures C5.a and C5.b, we attempt to demonstrate the fit of our model
in two ways. First, in Figure C5.a, we plot the actual price of coffee and the
price of coffee 'with the remaining inefficiency' in our model, after including
the position of speculators. Visual inspection confirms the regression results.
Figure C5.b contains the actual price as well as the 'predicted' price, without
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speculation, and it tells a different story.
Figure C5.a: Price with speculation
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Piecewise correlation is 0.999 and significant at the 99.9% level
Figure C5.b: Price without speculation
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On the one hand, it reinforces what is already clear from Figure 3b, in the
paper, that the effect of speculation on the price of coffee is spiky. On the other
hand, it demonstrates what others (Irwin and Sanders, 2010) have previously
stated before: speculation is not the most important driver of spot prices.
D.1. Significance
Although we have tried hard to present a convincing case when it comes to
our modeling strategy, we realize that our choice of a non-parametric model
has - at least - one downside: it makes it more difficult to compare our results
with the rest of the literature. Therefore, in this part of the Appendix, we
carry out a series of robustness tests aimed at confronting our results with
those obtained by others. In particular, we shall emphasize the importance of
establishing causality, by reverting to the same types of analysis as those used
by Irwin et al. (2009).
Figure D1.a: χD,W,F,Vt
0
5
10
15
20
de
ns
ity
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
inefficiency with long and short index funds
kernel density, bootstrapped 90% confidence interval
Figure D1.b: χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt
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Before we do so, however, we pause for a moment to consider the impor-
tance of (the lack of) stochastic properties of our modeling approach. As stated
in the paper, all of our hypothesis tests, as well as the rest of our analyses, are
carried out on bootstrapped inefficiency scores, following Simar and Wilson
(1998).
But what if differences in inefficiency scores after adding speculative long
and short positions reflect changes in the underlying data generating process?
In order to find out whether our results are robust to this, in Figure D1.a
we start by plotting χD,W,F,Vt after another round of bootstrapping (this time
with a more traditional bootstrap, instead of the Simar and Wilson (1998)
procedure already applied for the initial estimations). Instead of plotting the
(bootstrapped) mean inefficiency scores, in this figure we report the upper and
lower confidence bounds for the 90% confidence interval. What we hope to
see is a small confidence interval that does not vary much in size along the
horizontal axis (i.e., as inefficiency increases). This is indeed what Figure D1.a
shows.
Subsequently, and more interestingly, we apply the same line of thinking
to χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , in Figure D1.b. Again, the confidence interval is small
and does not vary much in size as inefficiency increases, suggesting that our
results are rather robust.
D.2. VAR analysis: impulse response of coffee price
In Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Irwin et al. (2009), two key tools are employed
to establish causality. First, the authors make use of vector auto regression
(VAR) models to study impulse responses from increases in - particularly -
long non-commercial futures positions. Second, and related, the authors make
use of Granger causality tests. As explained in the body of our paper, both
types of methods are not without their drawbacks, particularly in this specific
context. In the following subsections of this Appendix, we shall nevertheless
repeat their analyses. We do so, however, with a slight twist: instead of using
only the spot price of coffee as a unit of analysis, we also - in addition - use the
part of the spot price that, according to our results, is the result of speculation.
We start in Figure D.2 and Table D.2 with a simple VAR analysis. Table D.2
contains the key statistics from the analysis. Figure D.2 shows the impulse re-
sponse to the spot price of coffee from a one standard deviation increase in the
long position of speculators. As in Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Irwin et al.
(2009), the Figure shows that there is, on average, no impact from speculation
on the (spot) price.
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Figure D.2: Impulse response of coffee
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Table D.2: VAR results
Sample 7-240 N 234
Log likelihood -3159.412 HQIC 21.6758
FPE 2.29e+09 SBIC 21.8873
Equation K R2 P>χ2
long speculators 13 0.9126 0.0000
price 13 0.9220 0.0000
Notes: FPE= final prediction error; N = num-
ber of observations (lag order = 6); K= number
of parameters.
In our paper, we argue that this result is basically a 'statistical artifact'. To
see whether that is indeed the case, we now proceed to explore these results a
bit further.
D.3. VAR analysis: variance of impulse response of coffee price
We start doing so in Figure D.3 and Table D.3 with a variance decomposition
of the impulse response in Figure D.2: after all, our argument has been that,
just because there is no evidence of an average effect, this does not mean that
there is not, on occasion, an extreme (or spiky) effect of speculation on the
price.
Figure D.3 shows the result graphically. In essence, this figure can be inter-
preted in much the same way as the previous one, with one important differ-
ence: instead of considering the first moment of the distributions of variables
of interest (price, long positions), we now consider the second moment. In-
deed, the figure shows that there is a positive effect. In simple terms, although
based on Figure D.2 there is no evidence based on a VAR analysis of an average
effect, based on Figure D.3 we cannot rule out that there this occasionally an
extreme effect. Importantly, both figures result from the same analysis.
How can we tell whether our interpretation of Figure D.3 does not in itself
present a statistical artifact? To see whether there is evidence of this, we run
a fairly simple test, presented in Table D.3, following Lütkepohl (2005). The
Table contains, for a given lag length, LR test statistics compared to a VAR
model with one less lag. The largest drop in final prediction error and sharpest
decrease in AIC occur when we add the first lag, suggesting that the optimal
number of lags for our model is indeed one. The likelihood ratio test, however,
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puts the optimal number of lags at three. In either case, it does not appear that
our interpretation of Figure D.3 is the result of an insufficient lag length.
Figure D.3: Variance of impulse response
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Table D.3: Selection-order criteria
lag LR df p FPE AIC
0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.2e+11 26.4597
1 1172.2 4 0.000 2.2e+09∗ 21.4844∗
2 5.0 4 0.285 2.2e+09 21.4971
3 9.6∗ 4 0.049 2.2e+09 21.4905
4 3.6 4 0.466 2.2e+09 21.5094
5 3.0 4 0.554 2.3e+09 21.5306
6 7.5 4 0.113 2.3e+09 21.5329
Notes: FPE= final prediction error.
D.4. VAR analysis: normality tests
How appropriate are VAR estimations when applied to spot prices and long
futures market positions in the first place? In order to find out, we consider
the distributional properties of both variables. After all, VAR models use least
squares to minimize error, and as a result work best when variables considered
are normally distributed.
Figure D.4: Long speculators and price
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Table D.4: Normality tests
equation χ2 df Prob > χ2
Jarque-Bera test
long speculators 152.287 2 0.00000
price 2729.691 2 0.00000
Skewness test
long speculators 9.484 1 0.0021
price 180.438 1 0.0000
Kurtosis test
long speculators 142.803 1 0.0000
price 2549.253 1 0.0000
Figure D.4 shows the distributions of both non-commercial long positions
(the 'speculators') and the spot price of coffee. As is confirmed by the normal-
ity tests in Table D.7, both variables are skewed. In addition, the spot price of
coffee in particular is characterized by a high degree of kurtosis. As a result,
the mean of the two variables is not as informative as it would be if they were
normally distributed, as is also clear from the confidence interval in Figure
D.2.
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D.5. Impulse response of (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× coffee price
The previous robustness tests have shown that although a standard VAR test
yields the same result (no response of the coffee price to change in long spec-
ulators’ position) as in previous research, a variance decomposition based on
the same VAR estimates suggests that there may be an incidental response.
We therefore now proceed by repeating the VAR estimates, this time replac-
ing the main variable of interest, the coffee price, with its 'speculative' equiv-
alent, i.e., (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ) × coffee price. Based on our model and em-
pirical results, we expect two outcomes. First, we expect a positive impulse
response to changes in long speculators’ position, although the confidence in-
terval may still be relatively large. Second, we expect no effect on the variance
of (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ) × coffee price; after all, the latter already internalizes
the spiky nature of the speculators’ impact.
Figure D.5: Impulse response
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Table D.5: VAR results
Sample 7-240 N 234
Log likelihood -3042.996 HQIC 20.6808
FPE 8.45e+08 SBIC 20.8923
Equation K R2 P>χ2
Long speculators 13 0.9130 0.0000
price 13 0.2265 0.0000
Notes: FPE= final prediction error; N = number of
observations (lag order = 6); K= number of parame-
ters.
Figure D.5 and Table D.5 relate to our first expectation. Indeed, we observe
that - although the confidence interval is still relatively large - there is now a
positive response to increased speculation. With a reasonable fit for the equa-
tion on which the impulse response is based, an R2adj. of 22.65, these results
suggest that even with a mean-variance based technique such as a VAR model,
there is some evidence that speculation affects the coffee price.
D.6. Variance of impulse response of (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price
Figure D.6 and Table D.6 address the second expectation raised above. Indeed,
these results show that that is no significant effect of long speculators on the
variance of the 'speculative' part of the coffee price.
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Figure D.6: Variance of impulse response
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Table D.6: Selection-order criteria
lag LR df p FPE AIC
0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0e+10 23.0352
1 608.4∗ 4 0.000 7.9e+08 20.4692
2 8.5 4 0.076 7.9e+08 20.4672
3 8.9 4 0.064 7.8e+08∗ 20.4635∗
4 0.9 4 0.923 8.1e+08 20.4937
5 4.1 4 0.387 8.2e+08 20.5102
6 1.5 4 0.822 8.5e+08 20.5379
Notes: FPE= final prediction error.
D.7. VAR analysis, Normality tests using χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt × price
Naturally, given our earlier remarks regarding the relevance of the (normality
of) distributions in VAR models, we now repeat the analysis for χD,W,Ft −
χD,W,F,Vt × price and the long position of speculators.
Figure D.7: Long speculators and
(χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price
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Table D.7: Normality tests
equation χ2 df Prob > χ2
Jarque-Bera test
long speculators 128.917 2 0.00000
price 2835.113 2 0.00000
Skewness test
long speculators 8.634 1 0.0033
price 301.668 1 0.0000
Kurtosis test
long speculators 120.283 1 0.0000
price 2533.445 1 0.0000
Notes: FPE= final prediction error.
Results are similar to what we have found before: both variables are skewed,
and the 'speculative' part of the coffee price is also characterized by a high
degree of kurtosis.
D.8. Causality: Granger causality tests
The second tool employed by Irwin and Sanders (2010), Irwin et al. (2009)
and others to establish causality, is a Granger causality test. The long position
of speculators is said to Granger-cause the coffee price if past values of the
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latter significantly contribute to predicting the former, given past values of the
former.
In Figures D8.a and D8.b, we run Granger causality tests. In Figure D8.a,
we replicate along the lines of Irwin and Sanders (2010). Whereas Irwin and
Sanders (2010) use net future positions, we use only the long positions. Results
are not qualitatively affected by this, however. Another difference compared
with Irwin and Sanders (2010), is the fact that we estimate a VAR model for
the coffee market, whereas Irwin and Sanders (2010) estimate a SUR model
across all commodities markets. The reason for their choice of a SUR model is
probably the fact that they focus on index speculators. For that group, data are
available for a much shorter time period, requiring them to rely more on cross-
sectional variation. In our analysis, index speculators are the most likely to
affect the spot price, but they by no means constitute the only group of futures
speculators that can have an effect. We therefore focus on the total positions
taken by non-commercial parties, and explore in detail the time variation both
in the coffee price and in those positions.
Table D8.a: Granger causality
excluded χ2 df Prob > χ2
long speculators
price 8.6194 6 0.196
price
long speculators 3.2355 6 0.779
Table D8.b: Granger causality, χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt
excluded χ2 df Prob > χ2
(χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )
price 5.4409 6 0.489
price
(χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt ) 11.809 6 0.066
Despite these differences, our initial Granger causality results are similar
to those obtained by Irwin and Sanders (2010): we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the long position of speculators has no effect on the coffee price.
Interestingly enough, we do not find evidence of Granger causality in the op-
posite direction either (Irwin and Sanders (2010) do not report these results).
What happens when we replicate these tests in line with our own approach?
In fact, this is not straightforward: since the long position of speculators is an
input in the model, establishing Granger causality from that position to the
'speculative' part of the coffee price can be merely a statistical artifact. Instead,
therefore, we opt for something different. We test for Granger causality be-
tween χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt and the coffee price. In so doing, we rely on the fact
that the only difference between the two inefficiency measures is the positions
taken by speculators. By doing this, we therefore minimize a common pit-
fall in Granger causality tests: the existence of an unobserved third variable
which affects both the price and the speculators’ positions. Also, this test is
more closely related to what Irwin and Sanders (2010) aim to do, since we
now pick up the effects of the net position of speculators.
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The results for this second set of Granger causality tests are summarized in
Table D8.b. First, we observe that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
coffee price has no effect on χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt . However, with a p-value of
6.6%, Granger causality in the opposite direction is much more likely.
In the last set of robustness analyses, we have tried to the best of our abilities
to replicate tests from previous papers. In doing so, we have tried to find a
balance between staying as close as possible to those papers, and staying as
true as possible to our modeling approach here. At the very least, our results
indicate that even with more traditional approaches such as those replicated
here, concluding that there is no evidence of a causal link between futures
market speculation and spot prices is far from straightforward.
D.9. Lags, 6 month lag in DEA model (maximum between harvests)
Before we turn to some policy implications, we take the opportunity to con-
duct two more robustness tests. Both tests address the issue of 'simultaneity'
, and in doing so corroborate our results. In fact, in what follows here, we
are not solely aiming to further our analysis in terms of causality; we are also
trying to stay closer to our theoretical model, where speculators’ positions can
take some time to affect prices through inventory levels.
Figure D.9: Distributions with lags
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Table D.9: Hypotheses tests with lag
Hypothesis t-test KW KS
H10 : χ
D
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H10 : χ
D,W,F
t = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H20 : χ
D,W,F
t − χD,W,F,Vt = 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
H30 : χ
D,W,F,V
t > 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: KW= Kruskal-Wallis rank test; KS =
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
In Figure D.9 and Table D.9, we repeat our earlier analysis, but this time
include a 6-month (= minimum of one harvest) lag for all inputs, including
speculators’ long and short positions. From the figure, we observe that in-
cluding a 6-month lag does not change the inefficiency distributions much. In
Table D.9, we see that all hypotheses test results remain unaltered.
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D.10. Lags, Impulse response for 3 and 6 months
Now that we have established that including inputs with a 6-month lag does
not change our conclusions, we ask whether a lagged effect alters the impact
of an increase in the long speculators’ position. To do so, in Figures D10.a and
D10.b we consider the impulse response from an increase of that same position
on the lagged values of (χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt )× price. We include the latter in
our VAR model with both a 3 and a 6 month lag, respectively, to ensure that
we cover at least one harvest cycle (coffee can be harvested up to 4 times a
year).
Figure D10.a: 3-month lag
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Figure D10.b: 6-month lag
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If anything, we expect to see a more pronounced effect, compared with Fig-
ure D.5, since our model suggests that inventory effects play a role. The latter
may take some time to materialize (Deaton and Laroque, 1996). In Figure
D10.a, we observe that the impulse response is now indeed significantly dif-
ferent from zero after a few steps (= months). In Figure D10.b, the response is
immediately significantly different from zero.
E.1. Substitution effects: with S&P and price of oil
Now that we have thoroughly investigated causality, it is time to turn towards
the policy consequences that emanate from our paper.
In our conclusion, we argue that it is worthwhile to reconsider the preemi-
nence of oil in most commodity indices, given the destabilizing effects oil can
have on other commodity prices. In particular, we argue that there may be
a substitution effect: as the relative returns on oil drop compared with other
commodities in the index, commodity futures index funds shift more of their
investments into other commodities, strengthening the speculative channel we
identify in this paper.
In Figure E.1 and Table E.1 we investigate this substitution effect, albeit in a
rather rudimentary manner. In Table E.1, we calculate the simple correlations
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between χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , the price of oil and the S&P500. If the substitu-
tion effect exists, we can expect a negative correlation with χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt .
Indeed, this is the case for oil, although the correlation is not significant.
Figure E.1: Substitution effects
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Table E.1: Correlations
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt oil price S&P
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt 1.0000
oil price -0.0367 1.0000
S&P 0.0667 0.5596 ∗∗∗1.0000
Notes: Pairwise correlation; ∗ ∗ ∗ = significant at 1% level.
In Figure E.1, we plot the kernel density of χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt , conditional on
the price of oil and the S&P500, respectively. If the substitution effect exists,
we should see a downward sloping curve: χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt is highest, when
the alternative asset is at its lowest price. Indeed, this is the case for oil. For
the S&P500, there is no clear pattern (as expected).
E.2. Substitution effects: changes in price of oil
The analysis we presented above regarding the substitution effect, we consid-
ered the level of the price of oil. In our description of the substitution effect,
however, we focused on changes of the oil price. More specifically, we argued
that what might mitigate the relationship between speculation and the coffee
price was a sharp increase in the price(s) of other commodities in the index.
We now turn to this in Tables E2.a and E2.b. In Table E2.a, we split our
sample into two parts: one part where the oil price is increasing, and one part
where it is not. We then compare χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt for both groups, using a
simple t-test, with a Welch correction, to allow for unequal variances. Also,
we conduct a Kruskal-Wallis rank test. In Table E2.b, we do the same, but now
for the second order effect, i.e., the increase in the increase of the oil price.
If the substitution effect exists, it should show up in Table E2.b in particular.
It is indeed there that we find a significant difference in the average values of
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt : when the oil price is increasing rapidly, χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt
is significantly lower than when the oil prices in not increasing rapidly.30
30Note though that the p-value from the Kruskall-Wallis rank test is still relatively high, at
0.089.
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Summing up, from our analyses here and above, we conclude that there is
some evidence in favor of a substitution effect.
Table E2.a: ∆ oil price
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
∆ oil price ≤ 0 103 0.035 0.008 0.082
∆ oil price > 0 137 0.042 0.008 0.089
t = −0.607 Welch’s DF = 229.604
Ha: difference < 0 p = 0.272
Ha: difference 6= 0 p = 0.544
Ha: difference > 0 p = 0.728
χ2 = 0.843 p = 0.358
∆ oil price = percentage change of the coffee
price; Welch’s DF = Welch’s degrees of free-
dom (testing with unequal variances); χ2 re-
sults from Kruskal-Wallis rank test, with ties.
Table E2.b: ∆2 oil price
χD,W,Ft − χD,W,F,Vt
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
∆2 oil price ≤ 0 168 0.043 0.007 0.091
∆2 oil price > 0 72 0.028 0.009 0.074
t = 3.410 Welch’s DF = 118.871
Ha: difference < 0 p = 1.000
Ha: difference 6= 0 p = 0.001
Ha: difference > 0 p = 0.000
χ2 = 2.893 p = 0.089
∆2 oil price = percentage change in ∆ oil price;
Welch’s DF = Welch’s degrees of freedom (test-
ing with unequal variances); χ2 results from
Kruskal-Wallis rank test, with ties.
E.3. Market impact
In our introduction, we mentioned the 'limits to arbitrage' as an explanation of
why speculators might drive up the futures price. In line with Acharya et al.
(2011), we argued that the change in the micro structure of commodities fu-
tures markets resulting from a large influx of - particularly - long speculators,
could have an effect on futures prices, and thereby on spot prices.
Here, we take this argument a step further. In particular, we investigate
the possibility of market impact (Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). In Figure E.3,
we plot the total volume held by long speculators as well as the ratio of long
speculators to total futures trading. The figure shows that from 2002 onwards,
increases in the total market volume coincide with the influx of long specula-
tors.
If there is market impact, then according to our model (i) the effect on the
price is expected to persist for some time, and (ii) the impact should be re-
flected in χD,W,Ft and the price, but not in χ
D,W,F,V
t .
In Table E.3, we therefore test for momentum (Swed and Eisenhart, 1943).
We use a so-called run-test, to see whether observations of inefficiency scores
and the price, respectively, are serially independent. To do so, we apply a
threshold level and count how many 'runs' are above or below this threshold.
For the inefficiency scores, the threshold level is zero, i.e., we effectively test
how many times consecutively inefficiency is higher than zero. For the price,
in line with the standard test procedure, we use the median as the threshold
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level. For all variables, it is the case that positive/negative serial correlation
will result in a low/high number of runs.
Figure E.3: Evidence of market impact?
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Table E.3: Testing for momentum
Variable ≤ 0 > 0 N(runs) Prob> |z|
χDt 2 238 5 0.880
χD,Wt 5 235 9 0.000
χD,W,Ft 9 231 11 0.000
χD,W,F,Vt 52 188 44 0.000
price 120 120 11 0.000
Notes: non-parametric run-test, with thresh-
old(0), except for the price, where the median
is used as the threshold.
From Table E.3, we observe that the number of runs is below what can be
expected (based on complete serial independence) for all variables.31 However,
the number of runs is exactly four times as high for χD,W,F,Vt as for χ
D,W,F
t
and the price. Summing up, positive serial correlation is much less likely
once we control for futures speculators. Of course, this is indirect evidence of
market impact. More robust statistical analyses would require the availability
of longer disaggregated series for futures market participants (cf., Section A.3).
E.4. Impact on Fair trade
One of the key motivations for many who criticize 'food speculation' is its
the impact not just on consumers, but also on producers. For example, has
speculation affected fair trade, by making the latter less attractive to coffee
producers?
Fair trade coffee producers receive a guaranteed minimum price, which has
remained largely unaltered in the last 20 years. If the world price is higher
than this fair trade price, the latter is adjusted, and the producer receives a
small markup. Figure E.4 shows the development of the price, the fair trade
price and the price without speculation. For speculation to have a negative
effect on fair trade, we would expect to see that it is (partly) responsible for
pushing the actual price above the guaranteed minimum fair trade price. As
is clear from the figure, this is seldom the case, with the exception of the late
1990s and the late 2000s.
31Note that all p-values in the table are for two-sided tests. Since we are interested in the
one-sided p-value, we should divide all values by two. Also, values equal to threshold are
treated as if they are below the threshold.
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Figure E.4: Fair trade
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Based on market and fairtrade prices of Arabica coffee, data kindly provided by Fairtrade.org.uk.
Table E.4: Relation with fair trade
χD,W,Ft × price
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
fair trade ≤ price 23 3.503 1.226 5.882
fair trade > price 217 5.882 0.610 8.981
t = 0.916 Welch’s DF = 35.080
Ha: difference < 0 p = 0.111
Ha: difference 6= 0 p = 0.222
Ha: difference > 0 p = 0.889
χ2 = 9.073 p = 0.003
Notes: fair trade = fair trade price; Welch’s
DF = Welch’s degrees of freedom (testing with
unequal variances); χ2 results from Kruskal-
Wallis rank test, with ties.
In Table E.4, we look at χD,W,Ft × price, i.e., the part of the price that can be
attributed to speculation. We then construct a dummy that takes on a value of
one/zero, when the fair trade price is above/below or equal to the world price.
Upon testing whether χD,W,Ft × price is significantly higher when the world
price has broken through the minimum fair trade price, we find no significant
differences.
E.5. Consumer surplus
Is there a cost to consumers as a result of speculation? To answer that question,
we estimate the loss of consumer surplus by considering the effect of e f fcontr-
e f fl&s on the coffee price. Assuming a constant price elasticity of demand,
and a non-zero price elasticity of supply, we can calculate a rough estimate of
the loss in consumer surplus as follows.
First, we estimate the price elasticity of demand by regressing the log of the
price on the log of demand. Next, we can calculate the percentage change in
the price as a result of speculation, and after multiplying by the total demand,
we obtain the percentage change in demand, and the demand that would have
existed without speculation.
Having now obtained both the change in price and the change in demand
as a result of speculation,w e can calculate the adjustment in consumer sur-
plus. Comparing that to the original consumer surplus, we can calculate the
percentage loss of consumer surplus.
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Figure E.5: Consumer surplus loss
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Naive calculation, assuming perfectly elastic supply
Table E.5: Input for calculations
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
price 102.040 38.507
price×(1-χD,W,Ft ) 92.751 40.541
consumption 106,720 11,344
consumption, price×(1-χD,W,Ft ) 106,823 11,344
original consumer surplus 5,434,398 2,063,625
adjustment in consumer surplus 994,976 1,147,148
% loss in consumer surplus 21.482 26.740
Notes: nobs=240; estimate of price elasticity of de-
mand is -0.00897.
Key numbers from these calculations are reported in Table E.5. Average loss
of consumer surplus is more than 20 percent. Figure E.5 depicts the estimated
consumer surplus losses over time, showing that there is no clear pattern.
